Business Necessity in Title VIII:  Importing an Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act by McCormack, Christopher P.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 54 Issue 4 Article 11 
1986 
Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing an Employment 
Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act 
Christopher P. McCormack 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher P. McCormack, Business Necessity in Title VIII: Importing an Employment Discrimination 
Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 563 (1986). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol54/iss4/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
BUSINESS NECESSITY IN TITLE VIII: IMPORTING AN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE INTO
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
INTRODUCTION
During the 1960's, Congress enacted two analogous statutes to remedy
discrimination in areas of pervasive significance. The first, Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act,' was addressed to discrimination in employ-
ment. It was followed four years later by the Fair Housing Act, Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,2 a comparable prohibition of dis-
crimination in housing.
These statutes represent a congressional determination that certain im-
mutable personal characteristics are not proper factors for decisions in
employment or housing Under each, conduct is always unlawful if a
designated personal characteristic is any factor in the transaction-that
is, if any taint of intentional discrimination appears.' But each statute
has also been interpreted to prohibit facially neutral policies or practices
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)) (hereinafter referred to as "Title VII").
The critical prohibitory section is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1982). Title VII forbids employment practices that discriminate on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id.
2. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1982)) (hereinafter referred to as "Title VIII" or
"Fair Housing Act").
The critical prohibitory section is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982):
[I]t shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse
to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id
Discriminatory conduct not easily characterized as either a refusal to rent or sell or to
negotiate may be reached under the "otherwise make unavailable or deny" language of
§ 3604(a), an omnibus provision. Calmore, Fair Housing and the Black Poor An Ado-
cacy Guide, 18 Clearinghouse Rev. 609, 612 (1984); see Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect
and the Fair Housing Act, 54 Notre Dame Law. 199, 203 (1978) (language reflects intent
to reach "almost every housing practice imaginable").
3. See Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Stan-
dards, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 376, 377 & n.7 (1981) (Title VII circumscribed employers' unfet-
tered right at common law to hire and fire) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Dualism].
Representative Steiger expressed a similar view about Title VIII during the House debate
on the bill. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (Title VII pros-
cribes overt discrimination); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir.)
(under Title VIII, race is an impermissible factor in real estate transactions, even if it is
not the sole reason or total factor in discrimination), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974);
see also Calmore, supra note 2, at 625 (discriminatory acts violate Title VIII if race is but
one of the factors involved); Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 385 (intentionally discrim-
inatory practices cannot be justified as business necessity).
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that, in operation, have the effect of disproportionately excluding individ-
uals within any protected class, regardless of the defendant's lack of sub-
jective intent.' This "disparate impact" (or "disparate effect") standard
is necessary because the substantial difficulty of proving discriminatory
intent would otherwise frustrate statutory objectives.6 It can be a power-
ful weapon for the plaintiff challenging discriminatory practices.7
Courts and commentators also recognize structural affinities between
the two laws.' Interpretation of the Fair Housing Act has therefore de-
veloped through analogy to Title VII doctrine.9 Title VIII has, most
importantly, incorporated the Title VII prima facie case structure10 that
governs burdens of proof, persuasion and production in litigation under
both statutes.1" This structure consists of the plaintiff's prima facie case
based either on a showing of discriminatory effect (impact), as above, or
of discriminatory treatment. 12 A successful prima facie showing shifts
the burden to the defendant to justify the practice by presenting legiti-
mate countervailing business considerations. In a disparate treatment
case, a low threshold of "business purpose" can rebut the inference of
5. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (under Title VII, defend-
ant's lack of intent does not redeem practices that discriminate in operation); R.
Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law 59 (1983) (same, Title VIII). For a discussion
of this point in the context of Title VII, see infra Part I.A. For a similar discussion in the
context of Title VIII, see infra note 115 and accompanying text. Thus, statistical under-
representation alone may suffice to make out a prima facie case. See Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 & n.20 (1977); see also Comment, Statistics and Title VII
Proof- Prima Facie Case and Rebuttal, 15 Hous. L. Rev. 1030, 1036 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Statistics and Title VII Proof].
6. See Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1117 (2d Cir.) (Mansfield, J., dissenting),
reh'g denied, 517 F.2d 918 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975); Schwemm, supra
note 2, at 204-05; Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 379.
7. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 381 (disparate impact liability has the po-
tential to eliminate subtle forms of discrimination).
8. See Calmore, supra note 2, at 621 ("employment discrimination is important be-
cause Title VII provides the primary statutory development and analysis of substantive
theory of discrimination cases"); Schwemm, supra note 2, at 261 ("In many respects, the
analogy seems apt."). Numerous Title VIII cases have relied on Title VII authority. See
infra note 118 and accompanying text.
9. Calmore, supra note 2, at 625.
10. The concept of a prima facie case is not unfamiliar in other areas, for example in
jury discrimination suits, which also involve a shifting of burden. See International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977); Statistics and Title VII Proof,
supra note 5, at 1031. This Note distinguishes the prima facie case from the structure of
which it forms a part in Titles VII and VIII. This structure includes two distinct
branches, disparate treatment and disparate effect, each with its own mode of analysis, in
addition to the prima facie case. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 252 & n.5, 253 (1981) (Supreme Court has recognized different analysis for
disparate treatment and disparate impact cases). See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying
text.
11. Calmore, supra note 2, at 620.
12. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977).
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intentional discrimination.13 In a disparate impact case, a more stringent
threshold is imposed: the challenged practice must be a matter of "busi-
ness necessity."' 4 The principle of burden shifting forms a critical com-
ponent of the structure by relieving the plaintiff of the need to make the
difficult showing of intent. 5
Although the two acts share broad purposes and structure, they differ
in important respects. For Title VIII, the limits of the analogy with Title
VII are becoming more important as employers' discretion receives
greater deference in Title VII doctrine. 6 These limits become critical in
disparate effect analysis because fewer business considerations will suffice
to support the defense of business necessity in housing than in employ-
ment.17 Consideration of business necessity therefore brings into sharper
focus the distinctions between employment and housing, and suggests
that the useful analogy to Title VII doctrine should, in some respects,
give way to independent doctrine and analysis under the Fair Housing
Act.
Express statutory exemptions for certain activities or practices suggest
13. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (defendant
must articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for treating plaintiff differently).
The essence of the disparate treatment case is the defendant's intent. See Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (plaintiff's "ultimate burden" is
to prove that defendant intentionally discriminated); see also Note, Rebutting the Griggs
Prima Facie Case under Title VII. Limiting Judicial Review of Less Restrictive Alterna-
tives, 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 181, 184-85 (1981) (point of inquiry is to determine whether
employer's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus) [hereinafter cited as Rebut-
ting the Griggs Prima Facie Case]. In rebuttal to the prima facie case, the defendant
"need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proferred reasons."
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. However, the articulation must be made by admissible evi-
dence, not by answer or argument of counsel. Id at 255 & n.9. The plaintiff may then
come forward with proof that the offered reason is a mere pretext for discriminatory
motive. Id. at 255-56. The McDonnell Douglas four part prima facie case checklist, see
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, allows the plaintiff to begin the case without making
the difficult showing of intent. Only if the defendant rebuts the prima facie showing must
the plaintiff prove intent-in the pretext stage. See id. at 804-05.
14. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (Title Vi requires the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, unnecessary barriers to employment when they have dis-
criminatory effect); Calmore, supra note 2, at 624 (Title VIII). See infra notes 38-83 and
accompanying text.
The plaintiff in a disparate impact case also may offer evidence that the defendant's
proffered business necessity is a pretext for intentional discrimination. This option
originated in disparate treatment analysis, see supra note 13, but it seems to have become
part of disparate effect analysis. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982).
15. See Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-
Alternative Approach, 84 Yale L.J. 98, 100 (1974) (mere "business purpose" justification,
not subject to further scrutiny, would make it too easy for employer to mask discrimina-
tory motive) [hereinafter cited as No-Alternative Approach]. See infra notes 30-32 and
accompanying text. Although the need to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving
intent is particularly acute in the disparate effect branch, it is implicit in the rationale for
disparate treatment analysis as well. See supra note 13.
16. See infra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Parts II.B. and II.C. This narrower factual scope requires the adjust-
ments to business necessity analysis that are proposed by this Note.
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how notions of business necessity differ in housing and employment. Ti-
tle VII exempts bona fide occupational qualifications (bfoq), 8 the opera-
tion of legitimate seniority systems19 and the results of job-related tests.2"
These exemptions reflect congressional concern with minimizing interfer-
ence with business efficiency and productivity.2" Title VIII, in compari-
son, provides for exemptions based, not on the character of the activity in
question, but on the scope of the defendant's activities in the housing
"business."22
The absence of functional exemptions from Title VIII reflects funda-
mental differences2 between housing and employment. The employer
has broad areas of legitimate concern; a decision to hire creates a rela-
tionship in which highly diverse considerations of safety, efficiency and
the worker's skill can be important.24  In contrast, the variety of situa-
tions in the housing context is more limited and relationships are cor-
respondingly more stereotyped. The lessor or seller is principally inter-
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982). The bfoq exception allows express classification
by religion, sex, or national origin only when such characteristics are literally "occupa-
tional qualification[s] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [the] particular
business or enterprise." Id. Race is not within this exception, however, and is thus never
a proper basis for classification. The bfoq is interpreted narrowly. See Dothard v. Rawl-
inson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-34 (1977) (classification by sex). See infra notes 41-42 and ac-
companying text.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
20. Id.
21. See A No-Alternative Approach, supra note 15, at 104. Equality of opportunity is
important, but not absolute. Id. at 104-05 (Congress did not intend to promote minority
employment at the expense of business efficiency).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1982) (single family house sold or rented by owner).
The exemption is very limited. It does not apply if the owner owns more than three such
houses at one time. Nor does it cover more than one such sale in a 24-month period if the
owner is not resident in the house. Id. The statute further provides that, after Dec. 31,
1969, the exemption applies only if the owner sells without the assistance of a broker or
other real estate professional, id § 3603(b)(1)(A), and does not use certain prohibited
forms of advertising, id. § 3603(b)(1)(B).
A second exemption covers small rental units (up to four independent families) in
which one of the living quarters is the owner's residence. Id. § 3603(b)(2). This is known
as the "Mrs. Murphy Exemption." See Schwemm, supra note 2, at 232 n.228.
Religious organizations and private clubs are also exempt under 42 U.S.C. § 3607
(1982).
The small employer falls within an analogous exemption under Title VII. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982) ("employer" defined as a person who has 15 or more employees
for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks). Title VII, unlike Title VIII,
further provides for the functional exemptions already discussed. See supra notes 18-20
and accompanying text.
Transactions involving housing defendants within the Title VIII exemptions might still
be subject to challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982), which forbids discrimination in
the sale or rental of real estate-but only racial discrimination, see Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968), and probably only if intentional, see Schwemm,
supra note 2, at 234.
23. See Schwemm, supra note 2, at 235 (nature of employment relationship differs
from relationship of parties to housing transaction).
24. See infra Part I.B.
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ested in the applicant's ability to pay.25 Although a lease creates a rela-
tionship,26 fine points of skill, education and the like are not critical, if
important at all.
Judicial treatment of public entity defendants under Title VIII further
reflects these fundamental differences.27 Title VII applies without differ-
entiation to public and private defendants,2" whose interests as employers
are analytically indistinguishable. In Title VIII cases, however, courts
have developed separate, more severe standards for public entities.29
This different treatment evidences awareness that the role of the public
entity in housing, although analogous to the function of the private
party, is limited by factors that have no counterpart in employment.
These essential distinctions help clarify the proper role of the concept
of business necessity in housing. This Note will survey the origin and
application of the analysis in Title VII and the recent emergence of
greater judicial deference to employer discretion. It will then consider
some business matters common in housing. The Note concludes that
business necessity has a place in the Fair Housing Act, both as a defense
and as an analytical approach, but that it should have a narrower mean-
ing and application than it has in employment.
I. Busn-Ess NECEssrry: TITLE VII BACKGROUND
A. Origins: Liability Without Intent
Neutral employment policies3" that are apparently job-related and pur-
sued without discriminatory animus can violate Title VII. Liability
based on effect reflects two policy judgments. First, proof of subjective
intent is so difficult that to require it would defeat the purpose of the
legislation.3 Second, unintended discrimination is as invidious and as
harmful as intentional discrimination. 32
25. See infra notes 139-41, 151-53 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. See Note, Fair Employment Practices: The Concept of Business Necessity, 3 Mem-
phis St. L. Rev. 76, 86 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Concept of Business Necessity]. See
infra note 273 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
30. "Neutral" in this context means classifications that do not expressly categorize
individuals according to the prohibited personal characteristics of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Any express classification on these bases is unlawful. See supra
notes 1-2, infra note 89 and accompanying text.
31. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974)
("[e]ffect, and not motivation, is the touchstone, in part because clever men may easily
conceal their motivations"), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Schwemm, supra note 2,
at 216 (defendant less likely to escape liability for disguised intentional conduct because
objective effects are easier to prove than subjective intent). See supra note 6 and accom-
panying text.
32. See Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976) ("a thought-
less housing practice can be as unfair to minority rights as a willful scheme"); United
States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974) (arbitrary thoughtless-
ness as disastrous to prive rights as willful scheme), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); cf.
1986]
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The Supreme Court recognized effect-based liability and its corollary
defense of business necessity in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.33 The plaintiff
challenged the defendant employer's requirement that its employees meet
certain educational criteria.3 4 The Supreme Court held that conduct free
of subjective intent to discriminate could violate Title VII,a5 and that
disproportionate effect on members of a protected class was sufficient to
make out a violation.36 This represents an abrogation of traditional com-
mon law notions of intent and suggests a strict liability approach.37
The Court also left room for the employer to justify its practices, how-
ever.38 The standard enunciated is that a job requirement that has a dis-
criminatory effect may stand only if it has a manifest relation to the
employment, the touchstone of which is business necessity. 9 In Griggs,
the defendant's mere presumption of the requirement's usefulness, with-
out meaningful study, precluded such a finding.40
Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 376-77 (high minority unemployment attributable to
existence of unintentionally discriminatory practices that unnecessarily exclude
minorities).
33. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
34. The employer required that employees have a high school education, id. at 425-
26, or pass a standardized general intelligence test, id. at 427-29.
35. "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
groups .... Congress directed the thrust of [Title VII] to the consequences of employ-
ment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
36. See id. at 431 (Title VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also prac-
tices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation"). This approach is based less
in the language of Title VII than in the broad purposes underlying the statute. See
Schwemm, supra note 2, at 215.
37. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 379, 386. The effect is to enable the reme-
dial force of the statute to reach unnecessary discriminatory practices. Id. at 379-80.
38. Title VII does not require disregard of qualifications. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430.
But they must not be "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary." Id. at 431.
39. Id. at 431.
40. The requirements were imposed on the basis of the defendant's judgment that
they generally would improve the quality of its work force. But the Court observed that
neither requirement bore "a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the
jobs for which it was used." Id. The record showed, on the contrary, that employees
who did not meet the requirements had performed satisfactorily. Id. at 431-32.
In both Title VII and Title VIII, impermissible disparate effect often flows from poli-
cies adopted and enforced without thorough analysis of their utility to the business. Busi-
ness necessity analysis demands that presumptions be expunged and some documentation
offered. Although this protects the civil rights of the plaintiff, the defendant's interests
are often furthered too. The following comments on Title VII apply as well to most
housing defendants:
[Tihe interests of the employer in non-job-related standards often are minimal.
Businesses are generally meant to make money. The employer's chief interest is
to be as productive as possible. Discrimination on grounds other than ability is
costly to the employer. To the extent his decisions ignore considerations of
productivity, and are informed by irrational tastes and sentiments, he bears real
costs. When he restricts the pool that he considers for employment, he pays
higher wages for the privilege. Thus, requiring some showing of job relatedness
is, on an economic analysis, actually beneficial to the employer, even if it im-
poses some psychic costs. These psychic non-job-related interests of an em-
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Effect-based liability and the business necessity defense together con-
stitute a judicially-developed counterpart to statutory liability for inten-
tional discrimination and its "bona fide occupational qualification"
exception.41 Because the bfoq is a narrow and specific exception that has
been given a limited interpretation,42 however, the business necessity de-
fense is a necessary element of the overall structure: a business should
not be required to compromise its viability if its policies have a discrimi-
natory effect.43 The defendant's burden is not light, however:" many
legitimate profit-maximizing devices are vulnerable to Title VII attack
because of discriminatory effect.45
B. After Grigg" Articulating and Applying Business
Necessity Analysis
The Griggs articulation of disparate impact liability and business ne-
cessity analysis provided only minimal guidance,46 but the Court created
a structured analytical approach flexible enough to serve an essentially
fact-specific inquiry.' The doctrine has proven adaptable to highly di-
verse situations.
Most courts have construed the defense narrowly, imposing a signifi-
cant burden on the defendant.48 An early Fourth Circuit formulation 9
posited three factors to guide the analysis. First, the defendant must
ployer are not strong enough. . . to justify any significant differential racial
impact.
Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VI! of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1117-18 (1971).
41. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 383-84.
42. See 29 C.F.R §§ 1604.2(a), 1606.4 (1985); Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 383
n.34 (applies only to express classification on basis of sex, religion, national origin; very
narrowly construed). See supra note 18.
43. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 382-84.
44. See infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
45. Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability Under
Title VII, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 911, 912 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Business Necessity
Defense]; see also Rebutting the Griggs Prima Facie Case, supra note 13, at 200-01 (stan-
dard may extend to practices that select the best qualified applicant if dire economic
consequences do not result from failure to use the practices). Mere inconvenience is not
enough. Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490, 496 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
46. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 386; see also Business Necessity Defense,
supra note 45, at 911-12 (Court enunciated disparate impact standard but did not define
scope of business necessity).
47. See Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1981)
(fact-specific nature of inquiry evidenced by failure of courts to agree on formulation of
defendant's rebuttal burden), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); see also Judicial Dual-
ism, supra note 3, at 389; Senatore, Minimizing employer litigation exposure to disparate
impact discrimination claims in the hiring process, 55 Fla. B.J. 489, 493 (1981).
48. See Constitutional Laws-Business Necessity Standard of Title VII Discriminatory
Impact Cases Jeopardized by Newman v. Crews, 651 F.2d 222 (4th Cir. 1981), 55 Temple
L.Q. 435, 446 & n.20 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Business Necessity Standard]; Business
Necessity Defense, supra note 45, at 920.




have an overriding business purpose. Second, the challenged practice
must be necessary to business operation and sufficiently compelling to
override any racial impact. Third, there must be no available alternative
that would further the business purpose with less discriminatory effect.50
This approach has had wide influence5" and exemplifies the rigor most
courts have brought to the analysis.52 Only essential practices survive,"1
and dire economic consequences have been required in order to over-
come disparate impact.5 4 Inconvenience by itself is not sufficient, 5 but
where the disparate impact is slight, the employer's burden is corre-
spondingly lower.5 6 The availability-of-alternatives component is espe-
cially important because it removes the analysis from the realm of simple
balancing.57 A finding of less-discriminatory alternatives almost cer-
tainly means that the defendant's practices will be held unlawful. 8 The
defendant's failure even to consider such alternatives has been held viola-
tive of Title VII even if the plaintiff does not offer evidence of
alternatives.59
With general agreement about the outlines of the business necessity
analysis, its application was extended beyond the Griggs context of edu-
50. Id. at 798.
The practice at issue should actually (i.e. successfully) serve the business interest as-
serted, and be urgent or essential to the business. See Schwemm, supra note 2, at 220-21,
258.
51. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 398 & n.103; Business Necessity Standard,
supra note 48, at 448-49; Business Necessity Defense, supra note 45, at 920.
52. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 398; Business Necessity Defense, supra note
45, at 920.
53. See Business Necessity Defense, supra note 45, at 920.
54. See Rebutting the Griggs Prima Facie Case, supra note 13, at 200. The Lorillard
court expressed willingness to impose some costs on the employer. See Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
But see New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 590 & n.33 (1979) (sug-
gesting that cost to the employer is a relevant factor). What will be too great a cost for an
employer to bear will, of course, vary from case to case.
55. See Statistics and Title VII Proof, supra note 5, at 1045 n.150; see also Johnson v.
Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490, 496 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (to allow employers to escape liability
by showing mere inconvenience would be contrary to congressional purposes).
56. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 396.
57. See id. at 397; cf Concept of Business Necessity, supra note 28, at 83 (characteriz-
ing Robinson v. Lorillard approach as a balancing test); A No-Alternative Approach, supra
note 15, at 101 (same).
The availability-of-alternatives component can be useful to the employer: although it
sets a stringent threshold, he may escape liability if in fact there are no alternatives to the
challenged action. This possibility provides incentive to examine practices and eliminate
unintended discrimination.
The Supreme Court seems to have embraced the availability-of-alternatives analysis in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (plaintiff may show less-dis-
criminatory alternatives to defendant's proffered job-related tests). The current view
places the burden of proof of alternatives on the plaintiff, not the defendant. Detailed
discussion of this evidentiary issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
58. See Rebutting the Griggs Prima Facie Case, supra note 13, at 205.
59. See Allen v. City of Mobile, 464 F. Supp. 433, 440 (S.D. Ala. 1978) (failure to
consider alternative procedures fatally defective).
[Vol. 54
BUSINESS NECESSITY IN TITLE VIII
cational requirements. Employment testing was early recognized as a
fertile area for job-relatedness challenge under Title VII.' The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgated guidelines
defining a statistical validation process for evaluating the success of a
criterion or test in predicting job performance.6 ' The standard broadly
governs selection procedures used as a basis for any employment
decision.6 2
Job requirements other than testing and testing analogues demand a
different analytical focus because empirical proof of job relatedness is dif-
ficult.63 When disparate impact is alleged, business necessity analysis
must proceed more nearly as a balancing of the employer's interests
against the magnitude of the disparate effect. The employer's legitimate
concerns may be expressed as a matter of the needed degree of skill as
against the economic and human risks of hiring an unqualified
applicant.
The diverse considerations that employers have urged as matters of
business necessity illustrate the considerable utility of the doctrine. For
60. The leading example is Griggs itself. See also Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st
Cir. 1972) (tests for police officers); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d
Cir. 1972) (tests for school supervisors).
61. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1985).
The core of the process requires that the criterion be a valid predictor of job performance,
as measured by a prescribed statistical correlation between test and job performance. The
guidelines also incorporate the availability-of-alternatives component. Id. They have
generally been accorded considerable deference by the courts. See Rebutting the Griggs
Prima Facie Case, supra note 13, at 201. Still, they do not have the force of administra-
five regulations. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 393.
These guidelines preceded, and indeed were at issue in, Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34. The
Court noted that they were supported by legislative history and Title VII itself, and were
entitled to great deference. Id; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
430-31 (1975). "The message of these Guidelines is the same as that of the Griggs case."
Id at 431.
62. 29 C.F.Rt § 1607.2(B), (C) (1985). "Employment decisions include but are not
limited to hiring, promotion, demotion, membership (for example, in a labor organiza-
tion), referral, [and] retention .... ." Id § 1607.2(B) (emphasis added). Generally, the
guidelines require a relation between the selection device and some quantifiable aspect of
job performance. See id § 1607.16(D), (E), (F) (defining content, construct and crite-
rion-related validity). Subjective oral interviews, for example, are vulnerable to Title VII
challenge on analogous terms. See Hamilton v. General Motors Corp., 606 F.2d 576, 580
(5th Cir. 1979) (subjective oral interview not per se violative of Title VII where guided by
"meaningful, known objective standards"), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980). Subjective
selection criteria are problematic because they do not fit neatly under the disparate im-
pact (neutral criterion with discriminatory operation) or disparate treatment (different
conduct toward particular group) branch of the structure. See Robinson v. Polaroid
Corp., 732 F.2d 1010, 1015 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting difficulty of applying pure disparate
treatment or impact analysis to subjective criteria). See generally Rigler, Title VII and
the Applicability of Disparate Impact Analysis to Subjective Selection Criteria, 88 W. Va.
L. Rev. 25, 33-40 (1985). Professor Rigler argues that disparate impact analysis is broad
enough to embrace facially neutral subjective selection criteria. Id. at 45-46.
63. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 388-89, 394; see also id. at 394-95 (chal-
lenge to broadly based business policy requires scrutiny of the entire business operation
and the necessity of the practice in question).
64. See Rebutting the Griggs Prima Facie Case, supra note 13, at 197.
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instance, physical attributes such as height or weight are sometimes used
as cutoff factors in hiring65 and may tend to exclude female jobseekers.
Disparate impact analysis has been held appropriate in such cases, and
sufficient to render the requirement unlawful when not job-related.66
A prospective employee will often be asked to reveal a criminal record.
An affirmative response typically is ground for rejection.67 Although
courts generally disapprove of the practice,6" it remains common.69 But
its proven racially disproportionate impact70 brings business necessity
analysis into play. Such treatment is more often predicated on instinct
than on rational analysis, 7 and courts have accordingly required that the
65. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 323-24 (1977) (claim that height
and weight requirements disproportionately excluded women); Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines,
568 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1977) (similar challenge to minimum height requirement).
66. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330-32 (1977); see also Meadows v.
Ford Motor Co., 62 F.R.D. 98, 99-100 (W.D. Ky. 1973) (weight requirement, female
plaintiff), aff'd in relevant part, 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998
(1976). The Meadows court did not rely on business necessity analysis as such, but did
observe that the defendant had imposed the requirement without studying its relation to
job performance, id. at 99. This amounts to a failure to consider alternatives, which may
by itself support a finding of liability under business necessity analysis. See supra note 59
and accompanying text. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (crite-
ria adopted without meaningful study). The result in Meadows comports with business
necessity analysis.
One court has held blanket exclusion of females unlawful because Title VII requires
individualized assessment of ability to perform physically arduous tasks. See Rosenfeld
v. Southern Pac. R.R., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971). The Rosenfeld court's con-
cern with individualized assessment is echoed in EEOC regulations. See Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(1) (1985).
67. Comment, Employers' Use of Criminal Records Under Title VII, 29 Cath. U.L.
Rev. 597, 599-602 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Records]. Multiple convictions
are more likely to result in rejection than, for instance, a single offense by a youthful first
offender. But any criminal record is a substantial handicap. Id. at 601. Discovery of an
undisclosed criminal record after hiring has been used as grounds for discharge. Id. at
615; see Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519, 520-21 (E.D. La. 1971)
(reasonable requirement when employee has access to guests' rooms and property), aff'd,
468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
68. See, e.g., McBride v. Delta Air Lines, 551 F.2d 113, 114-15 (6th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 927 (1977); Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290,
1298 (8th Cir. 1975); Gregory v. Litton Sys., 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970),
aff'd, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
69. See Criminal Records, supra note 67, at 598.
70. Although some disagreement surrounds the proper statistical approach, a persua-
sive argument can be made that reliance on criminal records in the hiring process dispro-
portionately affects blacks, at least with respect to the general population. Id. at 602-03;
see Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1294-95 (8th Cir. 1975) (blacks con-
victed of crimes at significantly higher rates than whites; blanket exclusion of applicants
with criminal records therefore disproportionately disqualifies blacks). For example, the
black population of the United States in 1982 was 27.6 million, or 11.9% of the total
population of 231.5 million. See Statistical Abstract of the United States 1984, at 33
(104th ed. 1983). Yet blacks composed over 29% of those arrested in 1982. Id. at 183
(whites = 70.7%).
71. Criminal records often have little bearing on the applicant's ability to perform job
tasks. Employers' wariness notwithstanding, there is little evidence that employees with
records are poor workers or safety risks. See Criminal Records, supra note 67, at 602.
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conviction bear some relation to the employment in question."' Public
policy in encouraging convict reform also militates against affording em-
ployers absolute discretion in this area.73 Reliance on arrest records
properly merits even greater suspicion.' This largely undeveloped
area75 illustrates the potential of disparate impact business necessity anal-
ysis for rationalizing employment criteria and employers' real needs
where discriminatory effect results.
Employers also routinely inquire into prior employment history.76
When the inquiry addresses experience and is used as a condition of hir-
ing or promotion, it is subject to scrutiny for high utility.7 Rejection
may not be based on lack of skills that could reasonably be learned on the
job.78
Safety and efficiency are sometimes invoked as matters of business ne-
cessity.7 9 The argument is strongest when the factor giving rise to the
disparate effect is clearly related to safety.80 Courts hesitate to accept
72. See Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290, 1298 (8th Cir. 1975) (defend-
ant's sweeping policy unlawful, although record could be a relevant consideration in indi-
vidual hiring decisions); see also Senatore, supra note 47, at 490 (business necessity claim
best supported by showing that inquiry correlates applicant's record with job require-
ments; inquiries should therefore be tailored as precisely as possible to a legitimately
desirable employee characteristic); Concept of Business Necessity, supra note 28, at 86-87
& n.67 (record might support business necessity justification if adequately related to job
performance); cf Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La.
1971) (security-sensitive position made policy a business necessity), aff'd mem., 468 F.2d
951 (5th Cir. 1972).
73. See Criminal Records, supra note 67, at 597-98 (employment policies of barring
applicants with criminal records frustrate policy goal of reducing recidivism). Any mar-
ginal benefit to the employer should therefore be balanced against the policy of encourag-
ing reform, frustration of which may have substantial social costs. The disparate effect on
minorities should support a requirement that the employer at least look into the circum-
stances of the crime, not rely merely on the fact of conviction. For a suggested approach,
see id at 611.
74. Id at 614. The fact of arrest alone has minimal probative value on the question of
the person's actual participation in misconduct. Id; see Schware v. Board of Bar Exam-
iners, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957); Gregory v. Litton Sys., 316 F. Supp. 401,403 (C.D. Cal.
1970), aff'd, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972); see also Senatore, supra note 47, at 489-90 (use
of arrest records uniformly held prejudicial to minorities).
75. See Criminal Records, supra note 67, at 622 (potential of Title VII for restricting
and rationalizing employer use of applicants' criminal records largely unrealized).
76. See Senatore, supra note 47, at 491. The employer may legitimately base a rejec-
tion on a poor reference from a prior employer. Id.
77. See iL (author suggests that inquiry is subject to Griggs job-relatedness scrutiny).
78. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(F) (1985) (skills that can be learned in a brief orientation
period).
79. See Concept of Business Necessity, supra note 28, at 88-89.
80. See, eg., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1984) (no-
facial-hair policy outweighed religious convictions of plaintiff where workers had to wear
mask respirators); Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, 568 F.2d 50, 53-54 (8th Cir. 1977) (height
requirement for airline pilots essential to safe operation of airplane); Spurlock v. United
Airlines, 475 F.2d 216, 218-19 (10th Cir. 1972) (education and experience requirements
held business necessity for airline, which imposed them on pilot candidates; "risks in-
volved in hiring an unqualified applicant are staggering").
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arguments based on merely conceivable safety and efficiency problems."'
When efficiency is invoked, the employer argues that the adverse effect
on his business will outweigh the reduction of disparate impact that
would be achieved by discontinuing the challenged practice.82 In this
situation, the balancing test proceeds in its most fact-specific form. 3
C. Subsequent Uncertainty and the Future of Business Necessity
Despite the success of the doctrine developed from Griggs, business
necessity analysis in Title VII has not achieved stability. 84 More recent
Supreme Court cases send conflicting signals: while some treat disparate
impact justifications stringently, 5 others seem to reflect greater deference
to employer discretion.8 6 At the same time, lower courts have mani-
fested indecision about the defense8 ' and scholarly criticism of disparate
impact liability has increased. 8 Its future is therefore uncertain.
Several recent cases illustrate the Supreme Court's stringent approach
to some justifications under Title VII. It is clear that any express classifi-
cation by a prohibited characteristic is unlawful even if supported by
sound, convincing actuarial data. 9 This underscores the principle that
discriminatory animus is not needed for liability. Comparable strictness
81. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir.) (evidence did not
support defendant's argument that efficiency would be compromised), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971); cf Williams v. American St. Gobain Corp., 447 F.2d 561, 564 (10th
Cir. 1971) (showing of customer dissatisfaction resulting in economic loss supported
claim of adverse effect on business).
82. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir.) (defendant claimed
that change of practice would adversely affect efficiency, economy and morale), cert. dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
83. When a defendant raises safety and efficiency considerations, the court looks to
"all relevant factors" in evaluating the claim. Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 395; cf
Concept of Business Necessity, supra note 28, at 89 (same employment practice may have
a substantial disparate effect in one area, none in another, and be sustainable as a business
necessity in latter but not former situation).
84. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 400.
85. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 104, 106-08 and accompanying text.
88. See Willborn, The Disparate Impact Model of Discrimination: Theory and Limits,
34 Am. U.L. Rev. 799, 802-03 (1985) (although business necessity analysis is needed to
limit what would otherwise be "impossible" pure disparate-impact liability, it is an uncer-
tain limit); Business Necessity Defense, supra note 45, at 912-13 (doctrine "has been called
unsound as a matter of social policy"); Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory,
Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and
a Recommendation for Reform, 7 Indus. Rel. L. J. 429, 587 (1985) (disparate-impact
analysis unworkable because employers' inability to formulate alternative selection proce-
dures forces use of quotas).
89. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709-10, 716-
17 (1978) (differential by sex in contributions to pension plan unlawful under Title VII);
see also Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation
Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074-75 (1983) (per curiam) (differential by sex in beneflts
from pension plan unlawful under Title VII).
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is evident in an employment testing case9" in which a single component
of the testing process had a disparate effect on a protected group, but the
overall process did not.9 ' Despite this nondiscriminatory "bottom line,"
the Court held the entire process invalid92-- manifesting clear unwilling-
ness to tolerate any disparate effect.93
Other decisions point toward greater deference to employer judgment
about "necessary" employment criteria. The leading case, New York
City Transit Authority v. Beazer,9" was a disparate-effect challenge to a
blanket policy of excluding methadone-maintenance patients from any
employment with the defendant Transit Authority.95 The Court charac-
terized the statistical evidence of disparate impact as "weak," 96 but
reached beyond this evidentiary point to consider the merits of the em-
ployment criterion. Even if a prima facie case had been made out, the
Court said, the defendant's broad rule would have been adequately justi-
fied by business considerations. 97 The Court declined to limit the rule's
application to safety-related positions,98 an alternative that would seem
to better rationalize the defendant's interests and its employment criteria.
90. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
91. See id. at 443-44. In fact, the actual promotion rate of blacks was higher than that
among whites. Id, at 444 n.6.
92. See id. at 456.
93. See id. at 455 ("Congress never intended to give an employer license to discrimi-
nate against some employees on the basis of race or sex merely because he favorably
treats other members of the employees' group."). The Court emphasized that individuals
adversely affected by neutral policies are protected by Title VII even if the "bottom
line"-i.e., the effect on the individual's class-is nondiscriminatory. See id. at 455-56.
94. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
95. See id. at 571-72. The Court noted that the case before it involved only present
methadone-maintenance patients, id. at 572 & n.3. One of the dissenters pointed out that
the Transit Authority itself admitted that the policy extended to former patients up to
five years after completion of treatment. See id at 602-03 & n.8 (White, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 585-86.
97. See id. at 587 & n.31. Recalling the Griggs standard of manifest relationship to
the employment, see id at n.31, the Court repeated the district court's finding that the
blanket exclusion served the defendant's legitimate interests in safety and efficiency, even
if those interests did not require such a rule. See id. The Court said that the plaintiff's
weak showing of disparate impact was inadequate to make out a Title VII violation in
these circumstances. Id.
This highly deferential analysis has been criticized. See, e.g., Judicial Dualism, supra
note 3, at 413 & n.192; Note, The Employment Interest and an Irrational Application of
the Rationality Test. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 51 U. Colo. L Rev.
641, 654-55 (1980) (characterizing the analysis in Beazer as low-level "rational relation"
scrutiny). See infra note 100. The Beazer opinion also considered and rejected an equal
protection claim, 440 U.S. at 588-594, the "rational relation" standard of which might
have influenced the Title VII analysis. But the Court has elsewhere observed that Title
VII "involves a more probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly rea-
sonable acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Constitu-
tion." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976) (emphasis added).
98. This was the approach taken by the district court. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 578. It
is difficult to draw broad conclusions from Beazer because of its unique facts; arguably, a
less sympathetic employer action might elicit less deference. Nevertheless, the Court's
attitude is unmistakably deferential. See id. at 587 n.31 (sufficient that employer's goals
are significantly served by rule, even if they do not require it).
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While Beazer may arguably be limited to the narrow evidentiary ques-
tion of statistical proof,99 its implications for business necessity analysis
are significant. The broad deference to employer discretion in choice of
criteria is redolent of the lesser "business purpose" standard of disparate
treatment analysis.1" Moreover, the Court's unwillingness to consider
an obvious alternative casts doubt on the availability-of-alternatives com-
ponent of the analysis.1 In combination with recent decisions stressing
the minimal nature of the employer's burden in disparate treatment
cases, 102 Beazer suggests that, in the proper circumstances, the burden of
business necessity justification should be lighter for the defendant
employer.
If there is a doctrinal shift in the offing, however, its influence has not
been the only source of ambiguity. Lower courts have not always applied
the analytical tools consistently. Misapplication is occasionally the result
of confusing the disparate impact and disparate treatment branches of
analysis. 103 Cases often involve fact situations amenable to analysis
under alternative theories. " Such close factual calls compound doctri-
99. The opinion has substantial importance for questions of proof by statistical evi-
dence. See, e.g., Criminal Records, supra note 67, at 606-07; Note, Employment Discrimi-
nation-Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case and Defendant's Rebuttal in a Disparate Impact
Case, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 1187, 1195-96 (1980) (interpreting Beazer to mean that statistical
evidence must be more closely related to those actually qualified for employment); cf
Statistics and Title VII Proof, supra note 5, at 1039 (statistical sample must refer to avail-
able persons actually qualified to hold positions in question) (citing Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977)).
100. See Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 415-16 (incorporation of concept of pretext
into disparate effect doctrine may signal merger of impact and treatment branches of
prima facie case structure). See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
101. As a matter of policy, the Supreme Court has suggested (in a disparate treatment
case) that courts are ill-equipped to evaluate alternatives. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978) ("Courts are generally less competent than employers
to restructure business practices"). One writer has characterized this attitude approv-
ingly as a sound policy of judicial restraint. See Rebutting the Griggs Prima Facie Case,
supra note 13, at 209.
102. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-54
(1981) (stressing that the burden of persuasion in disparate treatment case always re-
mains with the plaintiff; defendant's burden is one of articulation, not proof, and defend-
ant need not actually have been motivated by the proferred business purpose); Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978) (per curiam) (same).
103. See, e.g., Williams v. Colorado Springs School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842
(10th Cir. 1981) (reversing district court's mistaken application of disparate treatment
"business purpose" standard to disparate impact claim); Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of
Am., 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La. 1971) (facts supported business necessity; court
cited Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) for "manifest relation" lan-
guage, but articulated defendant's burden in terms of "genuine business need": "its crite-
ria were reasonable and related to job necessities"), aff'd mem., 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir.
1972). This standard seems analogous to the business purpose threshold of disparate
treatment cases.
104. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15
(1977) ("Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress 'dis-
parate impact.' . . . Either theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts.");
see also Schwemm, supra note 2, at 242.
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nal confusion.
Courts have also taken different theoretical approaches to the analysis,
however. The majority of the circuits have taken a rigorous view of as-
sertions of business necessity 0 5 and have not emulated the deferential
posture of Beazer.'°6 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit, which had led the
mainstream development of business necessity analysis,' 7 seems to have
adopted a distinctly more deferential attitude.108
Considering the uncertain future of disparate impact and business ne-
cessity doctrine in Title VII, it is more critical than ever to understand
the analogy between Title VII and the Fair Housing Act, as well as the
crucial structural and philosophical differences between the laws and the
activities that they affect.
II. BusiNEss NECESSITY AND HOUSING: TITLE VIII
A. General Observations and Background
Residential segregation, the target of Title VIII, remains prevalent."
In addition to its primary effect on the housing opportunities of minori-
ties, it has significant secondary effects in school segregation and employ-
ment opportunity. °10 The relation between these areas is especially
105. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
106. See Williams v. Colorado Springs School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 840.41 (10th
Cir. 1981) (stringent scrutiny for asserted business necessities) (quoting Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)).
107. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
108. See Newman v. Crews, 651 F.2d 222, 224-26 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding disparate
effect of testing standard adequately justified).
The court's analysis backs away from the close examination typical of business neces-
sity analysis. The court quoted its own formulation of the business necessity standard
from Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971). See supra note 50 and accompanying text. But the court significantly omit-
ted stringent language ("compelling," "overriding") that it had used in Lorillard to char-
acterize the nature of business interest sufficient to support business necessity-instead
stating that the burden was to prove that the challenged employment practice "serves
legitimate employment objectives of the school district." Newman, 651 F.2d at 224 (em-
phasis added). The court further noted that the district court had found "both a rational
relationship to a legitimate employment objective and business necessity." Id. The find-
ing of a rational relation here is understandable, but the Fourth Circuit's willingness to
equate it with business necessity signals a sharp change of direction. The Tenth Circuit
has expressly rejected a rational relation standard for Title VII analysis. See Williams v.
Colorado Springs School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 841 (10th Cir. 1981) (mere rational-
ity is not enough, nor is it sufficient that legitimate management functions are served by
the employment practice).
109. Weaver, Housing Discirmination: An Overview, in A Sheltered Crisis: The State
of Fair Housing In the Eighties 1, at 5 (1983) [hereinafter cited as A Sheltered Crisis].
Residential segregation, far from declining, has instead increased. See Schwemm, supra
note 2, at 201. Comparable deterioration is evident in minority unemployment. See Ju-
dicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 377 n.9.
110. The relationship was recognized at the time Title VIII was passed.
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invidious because they are mutually reinforcing. 1 '
Segregation in shelter results largely from intentional discrimina-
tion. 1 ' Empirical evidence persuasively suggests that residential segre-
gation is not exclusively attributable to black poverty or inability to pay
for housing." 3 It is also clear, however, that racially neutral practices of
The increasing concentration of Negroes in the inner cities and the movement
of white people into the suburbs bear serious consequences with respect to
schools and jobs.
This de facto separation of races between city and suburb perpetuates de
facto segregation of schools. The educational consequences of such segregation
are grave....
Exclusion of Negroes from the housing market has the effect also of denying
Negroes equal job opportunities.
114 Cong. Rec. 9591 (1968) (statement of Rep. Ryan); cf Golubock, Housing Discrimi-
nation Against Families with Children: A Growing Problem of Exclusionary Practices, in
A Sheltered Crisis, supra note 109, at 128, 129 (aim of no-children policies may be in part
to perpetuate school segregation in predominantly white areas).
111. See Comment, Redlining, Disinvestment and the Role ofMutual Savings Banks: A
Survey of Solutions, 9 Fordham Urb. L.J. 89, 92-93 n. 10 (1980) (identifying a "multiplier
effect" by which discrimination in employment and housing influence each other) [here-
inafter cited as Redlining Solutions]; see also United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624
F. Supp. 1276, 1540-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (City's pattern of confining subsidized housing
in certain areas and persistent refusal to locate any such housing elsewhere in city con-
tributed to perpetuation of school segregation).
112. Most Title VIII cases have in fact turned on the issue of intentional discrimina-
tion, even where disparate effect liability provided an alternative ground of decision.
Calmore, supra note 2, at 633; Schwemm, supra note 2, at 238.
Purposeful discrimination has survived under fair housing laws in part by taking more
subtle forms. See Pearce, A Sheltered Crisis: The State of Fair Housing Opportunity in the
Eighties, in A Sheltered Crisis, supra note 109, at 143, 144. See infra note 198 and ac-
companying text.
Blacks are not the only targets of discriminatory practices. See Marshall, Women with
Children in Today's Housing Market, in A Sheltered Crisis, supra note 109, at 110, 111
(noting persistence of "significant discrimination against female[-headed] households");
see also Packer, Discrimination Against Hispanic Women in Housing, in A Sheltered Cri-
sis, supra note 109, at 114, 123 (sex bias "is alive and well") (quoting U.S. Dep't of
Housing and Urban Development, Women and Housing: A Report on Sex Discrimina-
tion in the American Cities, at ii (1976)).
113. See, e.g., Massey, Effects of Socioeconomic Factors on the Residential Segregation
of Blacks and Spanish Americans in U.S. Urbanized Areas, 44 Am. Soc. Rev. 1015, 1017-
19 (1979) (although Hispanic/white segregation is highly responsive to differences in
level of education, income and occupation, black/white segregation remains relatively
constant); Farley, Residential Segregation in Urbanized Areas of the United States in
1970: An Analysis of Social Class and Racial Differences, 14 Demography 497, 514
(1977) (patterns of segregation among whites and blacks of like education and income not
attributable to economic and social differences); Hermalin & Farley, The Potential for
Residential Integration in Cities and Suburbs: Implications for the Busing Controversy, 38
Am. Soc. Rev. 595, 608 (1973) (residential segregation attributable, not to economic fac-
tors, but to explicit or covert white discrimination); Taeuber, Residential Segregation, Sci.
Am., August 1965, at 12, 19 (neither free choice nor poverty sufficiently explains urban
segregation); see also Darden, Population Growth and Spatial Distribution, in A Sheltered
Crisis, supra note 109, at 7, 13.
Most past studies have concluded that upper income blacks are no less segre-
gated residentially from whites than lower income blacks and that poor whites
seldom live in the same neighborhoods as poor blacks. Regardless of income,
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business and governmental actors in the housing sphere disproportion-
ately limit the housing opportunities of members of protected groups.
Liability based on disparate impact and business necessity analysis are
appropriate tools for achieving the goals of Title VIII. t 14
The prima facie case structure, including effect-based liability, is now a
generally accepted part of Title VIII doctrine." 5 A plaintiff who can
persuade a court to apply the business necessity analysis as generally ar-
ticulated in Title VII' 6 has a powerful weapon with which to fight dis-
most whites live in predominantly white neighborhoods and most blacks live in
predominantly black neighborhoods.
l. One explanation advanced for this phenomenon is that blacks themselves prefer to
live in black neighborhoods. Id& at 22. But surveys indicate that, although blacks are
willing to reside in racially mixed neighborhoods, whites tend to be more reluctant to do
so. Id. The argument that segregation is attributable to choice also overlooks critical
distinctions between white ethnic immigrant groups, which clustered together because of
shared linguistic, cultural and religious traditions: blacks are linked more by common
grievances, and as an involuntary adaptation to discrimination. Economic factors are of
minor importance. Id.
114. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
This [disparate impact liability] rationale seems particularly appropriate to
Title VIII since its stated purpose of providing fair housing within the United
States clearly would be unobtainable unless the Act were construed to prohibit
not only open, direct discrimination, but also those practices which have the
effect of discriminating along racial lines.
Duncan, Hood & Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation, and Urban Decay:
Neighborhood Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 Urb. Law. 510, 530 (1975).
115. Despite some early disagreement over the applicability of the doctrine, see
Schwemm, supra note 2, at 200-01, the circuits now essentially agree that the disparate-
impact prima facie case is applicable in Title VIII litigation. See, eg., Arthur v. City of
Toledo, No. 84-3898, slip op. at 18-19 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 1986); Betsey v. Turtle Creek
Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d
1032, 1036-37 (2d Cir. 1979); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 & n.32
(3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1025 (1978); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976); see also
Comment, The Legality of Redlining under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 Am. U.L. Rev. 463,
478 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Legality of Redlining].
The Second Circuit approach remains unclear. In Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110
(2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 517 F.2d 918 (four judges in favor of granting rehearing, three
opposed, one disqualified; petition denied for want of majority of the eight judges in active
service), cert denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975), the court held that intent was necessary to
make out a violation of Title VIII, id. at 1113, in the face of what appeared to be at least a
colorable showing of disparate impact (the defendant's income criterion was alleged to
exclude predominantly-minority public income recipients). The decision has been tell-
ingly criticized. See, e.g., Calmore, supra note 2, at 632 ("[i]t is unlikely that Boyd is still
good law"); Schwemm, supra note 2, at 248.
The 12 Lofts decision casts considerable doubt on the viability of Boyd, but the Second
Circuit chose to distinguish it on the facts. See 12 Lofts, 610 F.2d at 1037 n.10. The
effort is not particularly convincing. The recognition of liability based on effect in 12
Lofts brings the Second Circuit into line with the majority view, and at the same time
erodes the doctrinal foundation of Boyd. Nevertheless, within a year of the 12 Lofts
decision, a district court in the Second Circuit cited and relied upon Boyd. See Dreher v.
Rana Mgmt., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 930, 935 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
116. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
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criminatory practices. "7 Because Title VIII cases are few, judicial
application has not been as consistent as in Title VII. General outlines of
the defense may be discerned, however.
For the private defendant, most courts in Title VIII cases have
adopted their circuit's Title VII formulations of business necessity. ' 8
Thus, as in Title VII, the courts weigh the defendant's interests against
the disparate effect of the challenged action, considering also the availa-
bility of alternatives and the costs of such alternatives to the
defendant. "9
Two distinctions are critical, however. First, there is some indication
that the recent trend of greater judicial deference toward employer dis-
cretion in Title VII cases will not have a counterpart in Title VIII. 20
Even the circuits that now seem to afford employers broader latitude in
defining necessity do not treat housing defendants the same way. While
housing cases do not follow identical formulations of the proper degree
of deference to private defendants' assertions of business necessity, the
burden is typically heavy. 2' Second, the Title VIII cases have developed
distinct standards for treatment of the public-entity defendant, 122 analo-
gous to business necessity analysis but reflecting the different imperatives
of public entities' activities in housing.' 23 Title VIII challenges to public
entity housing conduct involve either regulation of the housing activities
of third parties through zoning or permit policy,' 24 or the administration
117. See Calmore, supra note 2, at 624 ("if the court can be persuaded to adopt a
credible interpretatio[n] of the [business necessity] standard as adopted by a majority of
the federal courts, then a very heavy burden can be imposed on defendant").
118. See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988-89 (4th Cir. 1984);
Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Co., 536 F.2d 231, 235-36 (8th Cir. 1976); Williams v. Matthews
Co., 499 F.2d 819, 828 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
119. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text. Not all cases draw on Title VII
analogies, however, because of the different treatment accorded public entity defendants
in Title VIII. See infra notes 278-79 and accompanying text, and Part II.B. I.
120. Compare Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988-89 (4th Cir. 1984)
(Title VIII; high threshold of justification) with Newman v. Crews, 651 F.2d 222, 224
(4th Cir. 1981) (Title VII; distinctly less exacting standard). As already noted, see supra
note 108 and accompanying text, the Fourth Circuit in Newman moved away from its
previous stringent business necessity stance of Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,
798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), and embraced a more deferential
rational relation analysis. Newman, 651 F.2d at 224. But in Betsey, the Fourth Circuit
returned to the Lorillard view-gleaned, however, not from its own cases, but from a
decision of another circuit relying on Lorillard. Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988 (citing Williams
v. Colorado Springs School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981)). Betsey
mentioned, but did not quote, Lorillard. Betsey, 736 F.2d at 989. Seemingly, the Fourth
Circuit intends to maintain a double standard for housing and employment. If a more
deferential standard is appropriate for Title VII, then this is an excellent example for
courts that are in doubt about the future course of housing doctrine.
121. See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1984) (com-
pelling business necessity); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 828 (8th Cir.) (there
must be no acceptable alternatives),cert denied, 419 U.S. 1027 (1974).
122. See infra Part II.C.
123. See infra notes 283-84, 295-98 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
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of low-income housing and other assistance programs.'2 Regulatory ac-
tivities have no counterpart in the conduct subject to Title VII.126 Hous-
ing assistance involves the public entity in activities analogous to those of
private parties127 but critical distinctions, particularly the absence of
profit motive and the remedial nature of the programs,'28 limit the anal-
ogy. This phenomenon has no counterpart in the employment context,
in which the legitimate interests of public and private employers are not
analytically different.129 Together, these systematic distinctions point up
the underlying fundamental differences between housing and employ-
ment, and focus attention on the need for a different approach to business
necessity analysis under Title VIII.
Three distinct kinds of housing relationships have been held subject to
disparate impact liability, and business necessity analysis, under Title
VIII. First are those between principals to the housing transaction,130
typically the sale13 ' or rental 32 of residential property. Second are those
involving the provision of secondary services, 33 such as brokerage,"a
appraisal, 135 lending13 6 and insurance, 137 which affect the relationship be-
tween the principals but which are provided by non-principal third par-
ties. Last are those involving governmental entities, 38 for whom a
different analysis is triggered. Consideration of each of these areas eluci-
dates the application of business necessity to the housing "business."
B. Private Defendants
1. Housing Relationships Between Individuals
a. Sale of Residential Property
The seller of residential property is primarily interested in being
paid.' 39 The buyer's essential qualification is therefore ability to pay the
125. See infra notes 298-302 and accompanying text.
126. This writer is unaware of any Title VII discrimination challenges to licensing or
regulatory practices of public entities.
127. For example, public entities may be involved in the construction of housing (typi-
cally low-income developments) and the administration of housing rental projects. See
infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 303-04 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 273-74 and accompanying text.
130. See infra Part II.B.1.
131. See infra Part II.B.l.a.
132. See infra Part II.B.l.b.
133. See infra Part II.B.2.
134. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
135. See infra Part II.B.2.b.
136. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
137. See infra Part II.B.2.d.
138. See infra Part II.C.
139. See 114 Cong. Rec. 9583 (1968) (statement of Rep. Erlenborn); id. at 9573 (state-
ment of Rep. Steiger). In the typical transaction, of course, the buyer obtains financing
for the purchase. See infra Part II.B.2.c. The seller's scrutiny of the buyer's financial
soundness is then, in essence, carried out by the lender.
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price. This attitude is reflected in the remarks of the legislators who
passed the Act."g It is also implicit in the principle of brokerage law
that the broker earns his commission by producing a buyer ready, willing
and able to buy-ability being measured as financial ability.1 4' More-
over, the relationship between buyer and seller ends, unlike that between
employer and employee.142  Thus most of the employer's concerns are
inapposite in the sale of real estate. Indeed, the seller's refusal to accept a
good faith offer from a person able to pay the price is immediately sus-
pect, since the seller's right to the best market price-his only "real inter-
est"-is satisfied.' 43
The seller is rightly entitled to use objective criteria in evaluating a
potential buyer's ability to pay.'4" Clearly, a buyer's credit rating inter-
ests the seller, especially if the seller also finances the purchase. 145 But
the seller may less justifiably rely on facially sensible rules of thumb to
140. "In buying a house, this bill says that a man's bankroll and his credit rating-not
the color of his skin-will be major factors in his choice." Id. at 9583 (statement of Rep.
Erlenborn).
Title VIII was seen as requiring that one "must treat equally all persons who are in the
market for housing. That is, you cannot, because of one reason-race-refuse to sell or
rent property." Id. at 9573 (statement of Rep. Steiger); id. at 9579 (statement of Rep.
Cowgmer).
Although proponents of the legislation echoed these sentiments, there was substantial
opposition. The roll call vote of 229-195 (nine not voting) by which the Fair Housing Act
passed the House, id. at 9620-21, suggests more in the way of doctrinal disagreement than
was probably the case, however. Much opposition to the bill stemmed from its proce-
dural posture, which Rep. Brown summarized. Id. at 9597; see also Schwemm, supra
note 2, at 208-09. A number of the Representatives who rose in opposition shared this
objection while expressing sympathy for the aims of the Fair Housing Act. See, e.g., 114
Cong. Rec. at 9587-88 (statement of Rep. Morton); id. at 9588 (statement of Rep.
Derwinski).
Some Representatives also expressed reluctance to consider the measure in the highly
emotional atmosphere that prevailed in the days following the assassination of the Rev.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4, 1968. See, e.g., id. at 9593 (statement of Rep.
Dowdy) ("this bill is before us today, because of demands from mobs of rioting looters
and arsonists"); id. at 9589 (statement of Rep. Hagan) ("It is shameful that Congress
must endure such pressure. It is shameful that fear can dominate commonsense. It is
shameful that the criminal acts in our Nation are clouding legislative process."). But as
Rep. Horton noted, debate on the bill had been scheduled for the 14th before civil unrest
changed the atmosphere; he felt that "such events outside the sphere of Government
should not be permitted to disrupt or postpone action which has already been scheduled
by the Congress .... " Id. at 9607-08.
141. D.B. Burke, Jr., Law of Real Estate Brokers 99, 106 (1982).
142. Schwemm, supra note 2, at 235.
143. In a real estate transaction, it seems to me that the seller's principal interest
is financial-that he gets the best market price. ...
If the seller has a right to the best price the market will allow him, and the
buyer has a right to purchase the best house he can afford, then it seems to me
that everybody's real interests are taken care of.
114 Cong. Rec. 9583 (1968) (statement of Rep. Erlenborn).
144. Id.
145. Schwemm, supra note 2, at 235 (seller financing sale is concerned with buyer's
ability to meet financial and other contractual obligations).
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gauge the adequacy of the buyer's income,'46 for example, without some
evidence that they meaningfully further his interests. Such practices in-
vite attack if they disproportionately burden a protected class, and the
seller should be prepared to demonstrate that some thought has gone into
their formulation and application.
Subjective considerations may influence the seller's decision. 47 In
view of the congressional determination that race cannot be a factor in
housing transactions,148 however, such considerations deserve careful ju-
dicial scrutiny. 4 9 If subjective nonracial factors create discriminatory
effects and lack utility in furthering the seller's interests, it is unlikely
that a plausible "business necessity" could be predicated on them.
b. Lease of Residential Property
When the actions of a private landlord are held up to disparate impact
challenge, business necessity analysis is clearly appropriate.' 0 For the
landlord who maintains a degree of rationality between tenant selection
criteria and his legitimate interests, with an eye to his obligations under
Title VIII, business necessity can be a shield. For the tenant or prospec-
tive tenant wrongfully excluded because of criteria or policies not mean-
ingfully aligned with the landlord's legitimate interests, business
necessity analysis can be a powerful tool.
The tenant's ability to pay lies at the core of the landlord's concerns.
Present ability is important, but unlike the seller of residential prop-
146. Such a rule might express purchase price as a function of income-for example,
"[u]nder normal cases, families should not be buying homes costing over two and one
half times their annual incomes." S. McMichael, McMichael's Appraising Manual 169
(4th ed. 1951).
147. Title VIII provides that race, color, religion, sex or national origin may not be
grounds for refusing a sale. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1982). See supra notes 2-4 and
accompanying text. By implication, anything other than those characteristics should be
allowed unless it produces a discriminatory effect.
148. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
149. See Newman v. Crews, 651 F.2d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 1981) (Title VII; subjective
evaluations necessarily involve substantial potential for discrimination in application);
Wang v. Lake Maxinhall Estates, Inc., 531 F.2d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1976) (defendant's
refusal of plaintiff's full price offer, followed by acceptance of another's offer below full
price, supported inference of racially motivated treatment); cf. Bush v. Kaim, 297 F.
Supp. 151, 162 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (case under 42 U.S.C. § 1982) (owner free to rely on
subjective considerations, but may later be called upon to demonstrate that they, not
applicant's race, motivated him).
150. The landlord or owner of rental property is the housing actor most analogous to
the Title VII employer. Each deals personally with the subject matter of the statute and
the persons protected.
The actions of the landlord are particularly likely to be challenged on grounds of dispa-
rate effect because blacks are statistically overrepresented in the pool of renter house-
holds. Similarly, black and female-headed households labor under income/rent ratios in
excess of the national average. G. Sternlieb & J. Hughes, The Future of Rental Housing
65-66 (1981).
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erty, '5 the landlord desires evidence of the tenant's ability to continue
paying for the term of the lease.152 The landlord also wishes to preserve
the value of the property, an interest mirrored in the common law de-
vices that protect the reversion. Thus he also seeks a tenant of good
character. The central feature of the relationship, however, is the ex-
change of money for an interest in property.'53 A lessor's refusal to ac-
cept money should be regarded with suspicion comparable to that
accorded a seller's refusal of a bona fide offer.'5 4 The owner or landlord
properly may consider such matters as credit history and income, but
should also be prepared to show that the criteria rationally and persua-
sively relate to the legitimate end of ensuring payment.155
The landlord's freedom to choose a suitable tenant is a difficult issue
because his decision can never be wholly objective. Even so simple a
matter as defining a "successful tenant" is problematic; one court has
described such a tenant as one who stays for the period of the lease,
timely pays rent and complies with the lease terms. 5 6 Courts have rec-
ognized the landlord's right to follow reasonable, objective, nonracial
rental criteria, and to inquire into the prospective tenant's
background.'57
Beyond such minimal objective criteria, the landlord's decision may
151. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
Coop boards occupy a position somewhere between those of seller and lessor. Board
approval must typically be obtained for the transfer of shares from one owner to another.
Although the underlying transaction is a sale, the board takes into account the ongoing
relationship created by admission of the new owner. See Siegler, Cooperatives, Condo-
miniums, N.Y.L.J. Feb. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 1. Boards thus consider factors analogous to
those taken into account by lessors. See id. at 2 (listing factors).
152. Schwemm, supra note 2, at 235.
153. See B. Henszey & R. Friedman, Real Estate Law 261 (1979) (landlord's basic
right in the transaction is to receive rent; tenant's corresponding right is to the exclusive
use, enjoyment and occupation of the leasehold premises).
154. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. Cf Schwemm, supra note 2, at 235
(comparing housing supplier's refusal to deal with minority prospect to employer's re-
fusal to hire minority jobseeker).
155. Income as a criterion is perfectly acceptable; problems arise when it is analyzed
loosely in making a decision about a prospective tenant. Thus the sort of rule of thumb
already noted in the sale of real estate, see supra note 148, may be encountered in rental
as well. For example: "Except on the extreme income levels, rentals should lie between
20 and 25 per cent of a family's monthly income." S. McMichael, supra note 146, at 169.
Where the evidence of an income criterion's business necessity is weak-that is, where
it is not clear that the efficient operation of the rental operation would be significantly
compromised-even such a criterion should be enjoined if it has disparate impact on a
protected class. See Schwemm, supra note 2, at 249.
156. Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34, 37 n.5 (N.D. Ohio 1976). The court found
that the defendant had intentionally discriminated against plaintiffs, a mixed-race couple,
because the wife was black. See id. at 36. But even if intentional discrimination had not
been found, the court observed, the defendant's asserted objective grounds for rejecting
plaintiffs would have failed under disparate effect analysis: "Objective criteria cannot
have the effect of excluding blacks from housing unless the criteria are demonstrably a
reasonable measure of the applicants' ability to be a 'successful tenant.'" Id. at 37.
157. Calmore, supra note 2, at 633; Schwemm, supra note 2, at 239.
This right is not unlimited and may be examined closely. See Bush v. Kaim, 297 F.
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properly turn on personal taste: refusal may be predicated on any honest
basis unrelated to race. 5 ' But where subjective factors are concerned,
the landlord should be cautious about his conduct. Title VIII requires
landlords to suppress personal aversions to minorities.' 59 In that respect
the statute flatly limits freedom of action. Discrimination in this area
may well take the form of disparate treatment, 16 but where it does not,
Supp. 151, 163 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (case under 42 U.S.C. § 1982) (scrutiny of subjective
criteria).
One commentator has suggested four factors to consider in evaluating a rejection based
on the landlord's applicant characteristic criteria:
(1) whether normal procedures were followed in checking applicant's back-
ground; (2) whether normal criteria were applied equally to similarly situated
blacks and whites; (3) whether defendant's subjective criteria were colored by
racial prejudice or stereotype; and (4) whether objective selection criteria were
reasonable measures of an applicant's suitability as a tenant or buyer.
Calmore, supra note 2, at 634. "Sometimes pretext can be shown because defendant's
selection criteria do not relate to tenant suitability." Id at 635. The first three factors are
more nearly related to disparate treatment analysis. Indeed, in a disparate effect case, the
plaintiff by definition relies on the fourth factor alone to challenge the business necessity
of the criterion. This list thus illustrates how the two branches of the prima facie case
structure can overlap, and how each might be pleaded in the alternative.
158. See Schwemm, supra note 2, at 204; see also Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908,
910 (10th Cir. 1973) (Defendant told black plaintiff apartment had been rented, but told
white testers it was still available. Defndant argued successfully that rejection was result
of plaintiff's attitude and aggressiveness, but defendant lied to him so as not to personal-
ize the rejection.). Of course, if race plays any part in the landlord's decision, his conduct
will violate Title VIII. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
159. Title VIII expressly forbids outright discrimination. But a rejection predicated on
an apparently arbitrary nonracial reason demands close examination. "[T]here is no rea-
son to believe that stereotypes have ceased to be a factor in the dealings between blacks
and whites .... [R]acial discrimination should be suspected." Calmore, supra note 2, at
636; see also Stevens v. Dobs, Inc., 483 F.2d 82, 83 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(rejection held unlawful when defendant's reason was that there was an "offensive odor"
about plaintiff).
160. The right of the landlord to select a tenant he considers appropriate may well
conflict with the right of the prospective tenant to have access to housing for which he is
objectively suitable. Title VIII represents a congressional policy choice: "In a free society
... all of us have many rights; and one man's rights do occasionally collide with an-
other's. When that occurs, the one right must yield and the other right must take prece-
dence. It is a function of government to decide which right shall prevail." 114 Cong.
Rec. 9583 (1968) (statement of Rep. Erlenborn).
161. As in Title VII, the line between disparate treatment and disparate impact is not
always clear: some fact situations may productively be analyzed under either branch of
the prima facie case structure. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
Confusion can result where the plaintiff raises a disparate treatment claim and the
defendant offers a business necessity defense. For example, the mixed race couple in
Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Ohio 1976), claimed that the defendant refused
to rent to them because of the wife's race. See id. at 35-36. That is a claim of intentional
discrimination, unlawful in any view. But the landlord maintained that the rejection
flowed from his "policy" of renting only to graduate students and those financially able to
pay the rent. Id. at 36. This is implicitly a business necessity defense, as the court in
effect acknowledged in its dictum rejecting the assertedly objective criteria. See id. at 37
& n.5 (dictum). But there was evidence that the plaintiffs met the "objective" criteria,
and that the defendant did not apply the standards to white tenants--echoing disparate
treatment thinking. See iL at 36.
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an asserted "criterion" that has a disparate effect on a protected class will
be vulnerable to business necessity analysis.
Landlords often argue economic factors as the basis of necessity.162 At
least one case has turned on the pecuniary benefit the defendant landlord
derived from conduct that had a discriminatory effect. 63 This advantage
was one of several factors the court cited in holding that the conduct's
disparate impact was adequately justified. Nevertheless, such reasons
must be carefully scrutinized for genuineness' 64 and are subject to pre-
text analysis.
165
Comparison of tenant selection criteria with analogous matters in em-
ployment emphasizes the limitations on the transferability of Title VII
doctrine to Title VIII. The employer has broad, objective and quantifi-
able concerns with employee skill, proficiency and aptitude with respect
to the performance of job tasks. These concerns largely do not transfer
to the housing context. For example, training or experience criteria,1
66
162. For example, such an argument may be made when the plaintiff challenges an
income cutoff criterion. See Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110, 1112 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975); cf Williamson v. Hampton Mgmt. Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146,
1148 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (landlord's application of income cutoff held not plausible basis for
refusal to rent to plaintiffs). For a case involving general economic considerations, see
infra note 163 and accompanying text.
It is difficult for a plaintiff to overcome the seeming legitimacy of an economic or
business policy and convince the finder of fact that the disparate effect merits a finding of
liability. Calmore, supra note 2, at 636. This underscores the need for business necessity
analysis, which affords the defendant an opportunity to explain his policy while giving the
plaintiff the right to a satisfactory explanation.
163. Dreher v. Rana Mgmt., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 930 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The defendant
agreed to lease his building to a university for student housing, an action that removed it
from the open market. Id. at 931. The current tenants therefore had to relocate. Id. at
931-32. The plaintiff's lease was not renewed, and she sued under Title VIII alleging that
the effect of the defendant's action was to deprive predominantly black low income ten-
ants of adequate housing. Id. at 932. The court acknowledged that discriminatory im-
pact without intent could support a Title VIII violation, id. at 933-34, but held that the
weak showing of disparate effect was outweighed by the economic benefits accruing to the
defendant. Id. at 935. The court relied in part on the controversial Boyd decision. See
Dreher, 493 F. Supp. at 935 (citing Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d I 110, 1114 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975)). It held that the defendant's economic rights were "in
no manner diminished by the Fair Housing Act." Id. at 935.
This holding is consistent with Boyd, but the questionable status of that case combined
with the unusual facts presented in Dreher, where the landlord's action was essentially
economic in nature and had a weak disparate impact, minimize Dreher's precedential
value.
164. This scrutiny is analogous to that accorded subjective hiring procedures. See
supra note 62.
165. The pretext component of the disparate treatment branch has been adopted in
disparate effect cases under Title VII. See supra note 14. There would seem to be no
analytical reason to omit this adoption from Title VIII analysis.
166. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
"[T]he consequences of an error in admitting a tenant do not seem nearly as severe as,
for example, the consequences of an error in hiring an unqualified airline pilot." Com-
ment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 128, 174 (1976).
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tests to measure job-related skills 67 and even height and weight require-
ments168 may support an assertion of business necessity in employment.
These types of criteria have no application to housing decisions. Simi-
larly, cases under Title VII having to do with the plaintiffs' personal ap-
pearance have little applicability since the employers in those situations
typically impose the requirements for safety reasons, 169 or because the
employee must deal with customers 70 or wear a uniform on the job. 7 I
Such considerations may be credible in employment, but the landlord has
no comparable interests. 72 In a disparate impact case under Title VIII,
tenant selection involves a narrower range of permissible concerns and
corresponding applicant characteristics.
A landlord's assertion of safety considerations might be one of the few
areas in which a credible transfer of Title VII considerations could be
made. Thus, inquiry into criminal records 173 might be a defensible land-
lord practice. The issue has not been raised in a Title VIII case, but the
lessons of Title VII would seem transferable. The statistical disparate
effect on minorities would be the same in housing as in employment. 74
As in Title VII cases, courts should demand a connection between the
crime and the landlord's concerns. '7 Plausible situations might include,
167. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
169. See Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (no-facial-hair policy necessary because employee had to wear a mask respirator,
not an unlawful employment practice even though the employee was a Sikh forbidden by
his religious convictions to shave).
170. See EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 59 (D. Colo. 1981) (no-beard
policy for customer-contact positions; discriminatory effect on black males held sufficient
to make out Title VII violation because "slight modifications" would serve employer's
interests); cf EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1980) (similar
challenge to no-beard rule, but plaintiff's evidence fell short of making out prima facie
case).
171. Uniform or other dress requirements may conflict with an employee's religious
convictions. See, e.g., EEOC Dec. No. 81-20, EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6769 (Apr. 8, 1981)
(female bus driver's religion required that she wear skirt; employer required drivers to
wear trousers); EEOC Dec. No. 76-37, EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6628 (Sept. 30, 1975) (cab
driver's religion required that he wear turban; employer required cabbies to wear cap and
badge). Under Title VII, a statutory balancing test requires the employer to make rea-
sonable accommodation to the employee's religious beliefs unless to do so would work
undue hardship in the employer's business. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982). This balanc-
ing is analogous to business necessity analysis. In the context of religion, however, it
imposes an affirmative duty on the employer. See TWVA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 75
(1977).
172. Of course if the applicant's personal appearance somehow leads the lessor to con-
clude that the applicant would make an unsuitable tenant, this judgment would support
rejection. Such a case would shade off into disparate treatment analysis and is not really
comparable to the dress-and-grooming requirements typical in the Title VII cases.
173. The use of criminal records in the hiring process has already been discussed in the
context of Title VII. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
174. Disproportionate arrest and conviction rates in the minority population would
translate into a racially disparate impact. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. See
Criminal Records, supra note 67, at 598 (Title VII).
175. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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for example, protecting the property where the conviction is for a crime
such as arson or vandalism or protecting other tenants where the convic-
tion is for assault or robbery. As in Title VII, the public policy of foster-
ing convict reform.76 militates against affording the landlord unfettered
discretion. Similarly, reliance on arrest records should be circum-
scribed.'77
A neutral factor unique to the housing context, with considerable po-
tential for disparate impact challenge, is the increasing incidence of no-
children policies.178 Despite the prevalence of such policies, 179 there is
mixed evidence that they serve any useful purpose.18 Landlords recite
that the practice is needed because tenants are reluctant to rent in build-
176. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. If anything, the argument for limiting
the situations in which a landlord would be permitted to reject a tenant for having a
criminal record seems stronger than the same argument made as to an employer, at least
as to property crimes, because the tenant cannot steal the landlord's property, or that of
the landlord's "customers," simply by virtue of being a tenant: a tenant does not have a
pass key or access to the landlord's cash. A duty to inquire into the circumstances of the
crime imposes some additional expense and inconvenience, but probably not enough to
overcome the general rule that mere inconvenience does not amount to business neces-
sity. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
177. The probative value of mere arrest records is no greater here than in the employ-
ment context. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
178. See Golubock, Housing Discrimination Against Families with Children: A Grow-
ing Problem ofExclusionary Practices, in A Sheltered Crisis, supra note 109, at 128, 128;
Ridings, Discrimination Against Women in Housing Finance, in A Sheltered Crisis, supra
note 109, at 104, 108; see also Packer, Discrimination Against Hispanic Women in Hous-
ing, in A Sheltered Crisis, supra note 109, at 114, 123 (among "major obstacles" faced by
women seeking shelter; restricted access not attributable to economic factors alone).
Analogous policies with similar effects include limitations on the ages and maximum
number of children allowed in units, the sharing of bedrooms by children of opposite sex,
designated no-children floors within buildings, and higher rent levels for renters with
children. Packer, supra, at 125.
State law may regulate these practices. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:42-101 (West 1952 &
Supp. 1985); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 236 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1986).
179. A 1980 survey undertaken by the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment revealed that:
(1) Seventy percent of all rental households have no children.
(2) Nearly one-fourth of all units are closed to families with one child.
(3) One-fourth of all units are closed to families with children because of
cost.
(4) One-third of all units nationwide are closed to families with two chil-
dren.
(5) The extent of discrimination varies according to the racial composition
of the neighborhood, with white neighborhoods having a higher percentage of
restrictive policies (20 percent) than do black neighborhoods.
(6) Families with children pay higher rents than those without children,
and often must live in substandard housing in inferior neighborhoods.
(7) The newer the rental complex, the more likely it is that restrictive poli-
cies exist. (Three out of every five units built since 1970 have restrictive policies
against children.).
Ridings, supra note 178, at 108.
180. Assertions about the negative effect of children are questionable. See infra notes
181-83 and accompanying text. Some evidence suggests that landlords can charge higher
rents in buildings with no-children policies. Golubock, supra note 178, at 130. Such
considerations might be the sort of economic benefit that helped persuade the court to
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ings where there are children, and because it limits maintenance costs
and damage.18' Most tenants seem indifferent to the presence of chil-
dren, 182 however, and there seems to be no statistical correlation between
the presence of children and increased costs of maintenance and re-
pair.' 83 No court has yet heard a Title VIII challenge to such a policy,
but disparate effect on women, and especially minority women, is a clear
consequence.1 84 Proof may be difficult for the individual plaintiff,'8 5 but
a showing of disparate effect would hold the practice up to business ne-
cessity analysis. The apparent magnitude of that effect demands more in
the way of justification than the conclusory explanations usually offered.
find the defendant's conduct adequately justified in Dreher v. Rana Mgmt., 493 F. Supp.
930 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
181. See Packer, supra note 178, at 125. Landlords and apartment owners argue that
children are destructive, noisy and unruly, that parents allow children to roam un-
supervised at all hours, and that more doors are opened and toilets flushed, causing in-
creased wear and tear on property. Perhaps these concerns, so far as they are legitimate,
could be met by good management on the part of owners, and by owner/tenant coopera-
tion. Ridings, supra note 178, at 107.
182. One survey found that most renters "would not object if children were admitted
to their developments." Packer, supra note 178, at 125. A survey found that only about
one-fifth of renters in no-children buildings considered that fact in deciding to live there;
81% indicated they would not move if the policy changed. Golubock, supra note 178, at
131.
183. See Golubock, supra note 178, at 130 ("landlords often cite higher maintenance
costs as the reason for no-children policies, but.., there are no empirical studies or other
evidence to support such higher costs"). Managers who do rent to families with children
were far less likely to cite such problems than managers who imposed no-children poli-
cies. The usual assertions may be more a matter of misperception than of real business
experience. Id.
184. See Ridings, supra note 178, at 107 (Title VIII does not bar discrimination against
children, but "[s]tudy after study has concluded that these policies can and do exclude
more [minorities and women, groups within the scope of Title VIII] from particular
buildings, apartment complexes, and neighborhoods").
Minority and female-headed families are particularly hard hit by exclusion-
ary policies for many reasons. Perhaps the most obvious is that they are more
likely to be renters and to have children in their care than are nonminority and
male-headed households. In 1977 while only 26.1 percent of the housing occu-
pied by nonblack families with children consisted of rental units, 56.2 percent of
the units occupied by black families with children were rented. Thus, black
families with children were more than twice as likely as other families to be
renting....
For female-headed households the numbers show the same phenomenon as
for black households ....
Denial of access to housing because of the presence of children is also particu-
larly detrimental to minority and female-headed families' search for adequate
housing because they overwhelmingly tend to be low income.
Golubock, supra note 178, at 129 (footnotes omitted). One commentator has suggested
that landlords, knowing they cannot discriminate expressly on the ground of race or sex,
use these policies deliberately to accomplish discrimination without facially violating Ti-
tle VIII. Id. at 130. Such a possibility underscores the need for effect-based liability. On
balance, the argument for disparate effect liability in these situations seems strong. See
id. at 131-32.
185. See Golubock, supra note 190, at 130.
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2. Secondary Services
The purchaser of residential property typically requires a constellation
of secondary services without which the transaction would be impossible
in the modem market. These include brokerage, appraisal, lending and
insurance. Actions in these "real estate business" fields can have reper-
cussions sufficient to raise the possibility of effect-based liability. The
consequences of these effects are magnified because actions in each field
affect decisions in the others. Appraisal, for instance, is a service needed
by the insurer and lender as well as the buyer.186 Similarly, lenders often
require insurance as a condition for making a mortgage loan.187
The real estate industry has itself been identified as a factor in residen-
tial segregation.' 88 The problem is particularly insidious because the ra-
cial attitudes behind many practices are garbed in facially plausible,
seemingly reasonable "neutral factors."' 89 Requiring proof of discrimi-
natory intent would effectively foreclose challenge to such practices. 190
Disparate effect liability is therefore especially important, and business
necessity analysis is productive in assessing whether such factors serve
important business interests.
a. Brokerage
The real estate broker acts as an intermediary between the buyer and
seller of residential property. The business routinely raises civil rights
questions.' 9' The Code of Ethics of the National Association of Realtors
reflects the broker's obligations not to discriminate. 192 Nevertheless, in-
tentionally discriminatory practices persist. 93 Although Title VIII ex-
186. Lenders rely on appraisers for estimates of value and for the proper understand-
ing of neighborhood analysis for purposes of loan underwriting. United States Dep't of
Housing and Urban Dev., Redlining and Disinvestment as a Discriminatory Practice in
Residential Mortgage Loans 1-33 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Redlining Study].
187. Badain, Insurance Redlining and the Future of the Urban Core, 16 Colum. J.L. &
Soc. Probs. 1, 1-2 (1980) (banks will not make loans in older urban communities without
insurance).
188. See The Housing Advocates, Inc., An Annotated Bibliography of Housing and
School Segregation Articles and Documents 3 (1980).
189. Economic criteria, for example, are difficult to attack. See supra note 162 and
accompanying text. Such criteria are frequently encountered in this area.
190. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
191. D.B. Burke, supra note 141, at 283. A HUD publication for the real estate indus-
try (specifically brokers) reflects the fact that "real estate practices cannot fail to have an
impact on housing discrimination." Office of Policy Dev., U.S. Dep't of Housing and
Urban Dev., Fair Housing and the Real Estate Industry 1 (1975).
192. The REALTOR® shall not deny equal professional services to any person
for reasons of race, creed, sex, or country of national origin. The REALTOR@
shall not be a party to any plan or agreement to discriminate against a person or
persons on the basis of race, creed, sex, or country of national origin.
Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors Code of Ethics, art. 10, reprinted in F. Fisher, Broker Beware/
Selling Real Estate Within the Law 146 (1981). "It is very important that licensees...
realize that they must not transact real estate business in any type of discriminatory fash-
ion." F. Fisher, supra, at 26.
193. See Hobson v. George Humphreys, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 344, 348 (W.D. Tenn.
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pressly prohibits steering,1 94 the practice of showing minority clients
property only in neighborhoods populated predominantly by minori-
ties, 195 it still occurs regularly. 196  Other intentionally discriminatory
conduct is by no means rare, 97 and its guises have become increasingly
subtle.' 98 The broker who does not consider his or her practices "racist"
in the usual sense-that is, not "bigoted"-may still engage in courteous
but disparate treatment of minority clients.
These practices should be extremely difficult to justify even as a matter
of "business purpose." The interests they serve are negligible. As busi-
ness conclusions, they tend to be a product of ingrained industry ster-
otyping rather than informed professional judgment. 99
1982) (broker made different representations about asking price of property to black
plaintiffs and white testers).
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1982); see also Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1048
(E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd mem., 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977).
195. Steering is essentially a statutory intentional tort. The tort is one of interference
with what would otherwise be an open market. Liability requires some showing of intent.
D.B. Burke, supra note 141, at 301.
196. See Heights Community Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 139 (6th
Cir. 1985) (instances of steering violative of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1982)), petition for cert.
filed sub nom. Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. City of Cleveland Heights, 54 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S.
Dec. 31, 1985) (No. 85-1157); see also N.Y. Daily News, Nov. 15, 1985, at 22, col. 1
(settlement in prosecution of real estate broker charged with steering blacks away from
expensive and heavily white residential area); Baldwin Realtor One Of Four In Racial
Discrimination Probe, The Leader (Freeport, N.Y.), Dec. 12, 1985, at 1 (report of civil
suit charging that brokers "routinely deny blacks the opportunity to purchase homes in
white areas while, at the same time, encouraging them to move to already-integrated or
black areas").
197. See Marshall, Women with Children in Today's Housing Market, in A Sheltered
Crisis, supra note 109, at 110, 113 (survey found discrimination against blacks in 15% of
their visits to real estate agents).
198. The discrimination took the form of receiving less courteous treatment, re-
ceiving less information, or being shown fewer units. And the effect is cumula-
tive; that is, if a black visits four sales agents, he or she could expect
discrimination 48 percent of the time. Although the study's focus was blacks,
the estimates of discrimination can be considered the lower bounds for female-
headed black households and other sets of nontraditional households.
Id. Women face similar problems. See Packer, supra note 178, at 123-24 (quoting United
States Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., Women and Housing: A Report on Sex Dis-
crimination in the American Cities, at ii (1976)). For minority women the effect is
doubled. See id. at 123.
At each stage of the housing search, blacks received less attention than did whites, and
in general were treated less favorably. Pearce, supra note 112, at 145. Thus, more whites
were shown the multiple listings book and were invited to see homes. Id. Agents spent
more time with blacks determining if they were financially able to buy a home. For white
customers, the emphasis was on selling the home and arranging financing. Id. Agents
treated blacks with courtesy and respect; only comparison with the treatment accorded
white homeseekers revealed the differences. Id.
199. It is no defense to say that the broker merely followed community customs. D.B.
Burke, supra note 141, at 301. If there is any nondiscriminatory reason for steering, it
would seem to be that the broker believes, honestly and without racial animus, that the
customers prefer it this way. See deVise, Housing Discrimination in the Chicago Metro-
politan Area: The Legacy of the Brown Decision, 34 DePaul L. Rev. 491, 502-03 (1985)
(broker perceives segregation to be preference of both buyer and community). Even if
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More properly, the broker's legitimate interests are implicit in the rule
that the broker earns his commission when he produces a buyer ready,
willing and financially able to buy.2" The inquiry should end at the
prospective purchaser's financial ability to pay the price; to this extent
the broker's interests are coextensive with those of the seller he repre-
sents,20 and his right to rely on subjective factors should be no broader.
The broker who treates legitimate "prospects" discriminatorily limits his
own potential economic benefit.202 But if brokerage practices yield dispa-
rate effects, business necessity analysis has a force beyond mere self-inter-




The function of the appraiser is to evaluate the market value of real
property.2°4 Historically, the appraisal profession regarded its task as
one based on experience and subjective judgment tempered by familiarity
this reasoning would be a cognizable "business purpose" in the disparate treatment
branch of the analysis, it would seem improbable that it could support an assertion of
"business necessity."
200. See D.B. Burke, supra note 141, at 99, 106. In the minority view, the broker earns
his commission only when the sale is consummated-that is, on closing rather than
merely on producing an able buyer. See id. at 109. This distinction does not alter the
essence of the principle for present purposes. As Professor Burke observes, the minority
view merely reflects the fact that "the practical test of a purchaser's... financial ability is
met only at the closing." Id.
201. The broker is an agent of the seller for the purposes of the sale. Id. at 191-92.
The resulting duties include "a duty to further the interests of his client, both legal and
financial, and to avoid the loss of... legal rights." Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
202. Discriminatory practices limit the pool of possible buyers. One commentator has
observed that such practices may force employers to pay more for labor because they
limit the pool of eligible workers unnecessarily. See supra note 40. By analogy, artificial
limitations on the size of the buyer pool would seem likely to lower housing prices-and
decrease the broker's commission-by restricting demand.
203. As a matter of policy, HUD has counseled real estate brokers to avoid conduct
that has discriminatory effects. See Fair Housing and the Real Estate Industry, supra
note 191, at 6, 10-12. HUD expressed the business necessity analysis as prohibiting con-
duct that "either has no valid business-related purpose; or does have a valid business-
related purpose, but ... can be accomplished in some other way without having an
exclusionary or harmful impact on minority groups." Id. at 10. This formulation tracks
the majority view of business necessity analysis. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying
text.
204. See Wendt, Recent Developments in Appraisal Theory, in 1 Readings in Real Prop-
erty Valuation Principles 307, 307 (1977) (market value "central concept in real estate
valuation").
Even though the appraisal is a concrete figure, "appraising real estate is not believed to
be an exact science." R. Arnold, How to Estimate Market Value in Selling Real Estate
25 (1962); see also Redlining Study, supra note 186, at 1-27 (appraiser seeks to mirror the
market as seen through the eyes of the typically informed purchaser). The resulting ten-
sion between the objective ideal and the subjective reality is at the center of the debate
when the disparate effect of appraisal practices is raised.
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with local market conditions. 20 5  In recent years the profession has
moved toward objective criteria intended to make appraisals more quan-
titative and less dependent on the individual appraiser's personal
judgment.2 6
The underlying tension between objectivity and subjectivity has gener-
ated differences of opinion within the profession concerning the proper
role of subjective factors and personal experience. 7 At the same time,
appraisers seem to agree that their goal is to predict an objectively "accu-
rate" market price.20" The emphasis on objectivity and market reality
conflicts with the appraiser's inevitable reliance, at least to some extent,
on his subjective judgment.
Even some traditional "neutral factors" now are acknowledged to be
products of accepted wisdom rather than statistical or scientific analy-
sis.2a 9 For example, the profession for many years considered the age
and racial composition of neighborhoods to be relevant objective fac-
tors. 210 But little more than presumption supported these criteria. No
systematic relationship seems to link racial composition of an area and
decreasing property values.211
205. In the early years of the [American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers]-
and, as a matter of fact, before its formation-the principal emphasis was
placed on experience. Judges, for instance, considered the principal qualifica-
tion for an appraiser [as an expert witness] to be "forty years of experience as a
broker."
Dolman, The Appraiser's Dilemma, in 1 Readings in Real Property Valuation Principles
43, 46 (1977).
206. See Ratcliff, Is There a "New School" of Appraisal Thought?, in I Readings in
Real Property Valuation Principles 61, 62 (1977) (one "school" focuses on mechanisms
of appraisal analysis); Dolman, supra note 205, at 45 (criticizing the "tendency to con-
sider the most detailed and documented report as necessarily the most ethical and one
least responsible for a divergency").
207. Compare L. Ellwood, Ellwood Tables for Real Estate Appraising and Financing
xiii (4th ed. 1977) ("experience can teach lessons which may lead to sound judgment....
[but] I find it difficult to accept the notion that dependable valuation of real estate is
nothing more than experience and judgment.") with Dolman, supra note 205, at 46
("greater emphasis must now be placed on the factor of judgment").
208. See Ratcliff, supra note 206, at 63-64 (appraiser's "simple, direct and realistic"
task is to judge the probable selling price of the property; appraiser must assume client
seeks prediction of value under conditions as they actually exist, regardless of "fairness").
209. One commentator observed general acceptance within the profession of what he
called a "Gresham's Law of Neighborhoods"-that bad neighbors and bad people drive
out good neighbors and good people. Redlining Study, supra note 186, at 1-29. Appar-
ently, "bad" meant "minority," yet subsequent studies revealed no correlation between
racial change and property value. Id. at 1-29-30.
Less objectionable yet no more quantified neutral factors might include, for example,
the architectural consistency of the neighborhood, changing patterns of land use (such as
evolution from residential to commercial), the availability of similar property in the local
market, or the condition of the building. See R. Arnold, supra note 204, at 31-32.
210. Badain, supra note 187, at 35.
211. See Redlining Study, supra note 186, at 111-2 ("The literature on property values
and race and on mortgage delinquency and foreclosures reveal [sic] no systematic rela-
tionship between race, composition of an area, decreasing property values, increasing
rates of delinquency or foreclosures.").
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The appraiser's dilemma is nowhere more acute than in the use of ra-
cial and ethnic characteristics in and of themselves as factors in comput-
ing property value.2" 2 Reliance on such factors seems not to have been
meant as endorsement, 213 but merely to reflect what was widely regarded
by the profession as socioeconomic reality.21 4
These attitudes are changing. A major appraisers' organization, the
American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers (AIREA), was sued under
Title VIII by the United States in 1976.215 AIREA entered into a settle-
ment agreement that renounced racial, ethnic or religious homogeneity
as "desirable" factors.216 The decree also provided that racial, religious
and ethnic characteristics are not reliable predictors of value, and that it
is improper to base an appraisal on stereotyped or biased racial
presumptions.217
These principles exemplify the trend toward decreased reliance on pre-
sumptions involving race and racial characteristics. 218  The inevitable
subjectivity of appraisal requires courts, as well as appraisers and their
clients, to remain alert to judgments that seem to rely on conclusory ra-
212. Certain ethnic or racial characteristics were assumed to influence the value of real
estate. See infra notes 213-14.
213. Appraisers seek to measure the value of the property in the real world. They do
not ask whether the factors that influence that value are fair or rational-only whether
they influence it. Some of the literature endorsing the use of racial criteria therefore
carefully emphasizes that the appraiser need not share the sentiments his professional
opinion reflects. See S. McMichael, supra note 146, at 164-65 (tastes and desires of gen-
eral market, not those of appraiser, influence valuation). Thus on the role of racial transi-
tion in property value: "Whether rightly or wrongly, some families avoid or leave a
neighborhood of mixed race or national origin. This reduces the market for homes in the
area, and consequently may at first affect values adversely." Id. at 169. MeMichael's
Manual, an "early and respected appraisal text," Redlining Study, supra note 186, at III-
38, reproduced a list of 10 racial and ethnic characteristics that supposedly "registers an
opinion or prejudice that is reflected in land values." S. MeMichael, supra note 146, at
160. The author somewhat apologetically cautioned that the "classifications may be sci-
entifically misleading from a standpoint of inherent racial characteristics," 1d., but
presented the ranking seriously. It is embarrassing to the modem reader; one can
scarcely imagine the meaning, still less the significance,of categories such as "Jews (lower
class)." See id. Yet such was the attitude of appraisers to ethnic characteristics as
predictors of market value.
214. See United States v. American Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 442 F. Supp. 1072,
1085 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (individual appraiser opposed consent decree, arguing that it re-
stricted his freedom to take into account racial and ethnic factors that he considered
"relevant to the appraisal profession"), appeal dismissed, 590 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978).
215. Id. at 1076. The court held, as a matter of its jurisdiction to enter the settlement
order, that the United States had stated a claim under the Fair Housing Act against the
Institute. Id. at 1078-79.
216. Id. at 1077.
217. Id. Although the consent decree is a welcome recognition of problems within the
profession, it lacks the force of a judgment on the merits and binds only those who are
party to it. Id. at 1084-85.
218. See Redlining Study, supra note 186, at 1-29 (some members of profession ac-
knowledging that bias against integrated neighborhoods is unwarranted); see also id. at I-
30 (professional organization reviewing its teaching materials to expunge biased views).
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cial factors;2 9 the AIREA decree provides useful guidance toward this
end. That alertness must be tempered by a proper sympathy for the inev-
itable uncertainty of the appraiser's task.Y0 But statistical or demo-
graphic support should be required of an appraiser who chooses to rely,
for instance, on the racial composition of a neighborhood. If a valid ar-
gument can be made for such a proposition as a matter of business neces-
sity, courts should demand that it be made.
c. Lending and Mortgage Redlining
Once the buyer finds an attractive property and a willing seller the
critical next step is to procure financing-a mortgage. But discrimina-
tion in home financing seriously impedes minorities from doing so. 22
While Title VIII prohibits express discrimination in residential financ-
ing,21 the use of neutral, facially reasonable criteria may disproportion-
ately exclude minority applicants." 3 The problem, as with appraisal, is
that objectively cautious policies may be merely arbitrary.2 4
Like the appraiser, the lender seeks to make sound professional deci-
219. Such presumptions may be encountered even when the appraiser is otherwise
sympathetic to the aims and problems of fair housing. Consider the following statement
concerning obstacles to the construction of low-income housing in cities: "[t]his problem
... is compounded by... the disposition of sponsors to seek inexpensive sites in less
socially complicated outlying areas where problems in tenant relations are expected to
cause less difficulties .... ." White, Values and Valuation Techniques in the Seventies, in 1
Readings in Real Property Valuation Principles 49, 53 (1977) (emphasis added). Wari-
ness of such statements, or at least a healthy curiosity about the support behind them,
would serve a court or litigant well.
220. The appraiser's opinion of market value is at best an informed professional evalu-
ation of probability, or a range of predicted selling prices. Ratelif, supra note 206, at 65-
66.
221. Searing, Discrimination in Home Finance, 48 Notre Dame Law. 1113, 1113-14
(1973).
222. See 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1982).
Express discrimination may take many forms, from outright denial of mortgage credit
for minorities to refusal to extend credit to such borrowers for the purchase of property in
white neighborhoods. Minorities may also face different conditions such as higher inter-
est, shorter terms or larger down payments. More subtle is denial of credit to white
borrowers for the purchase of property in black or integrating neighborhoods. Searing,
supra note 221, at 1113-14; see also Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56
B.U.L. Rev. 989 (1976) (similar practices imposed in designated geographical areas)
[hereinafter cited as Attacking Redlining].
223. For example, arbitrarily discounting all or part of a working wife's income in
computing total family income, noninclusion of stable income from overtime, production
bonuses and part-time work, or the use of isolated credit difficulties as an absolute bar to
obtaining a loan, all of which may disproportionately burden minorities. Searing, supra
note 221, at 1114.
224. See Redlining Solutions, supra note 111, at 124. Lending practices are frequently
based on assumptions rather than sound business judgment. Comment, The Legality of
Redlining under the Civil Rights Laws, 25 Am. U.L. Rev. 463, 482 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Legality of Redlining].
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sions.2 25 The bank officer is further constrained by the fiduciary duty
owed depositors.226 Bankers face double pressure to make prudent judg-
ments because a high default rate will compromise chances of profes-
sional advancement.227 These professional exigencies may conflict with
the imperatives of Title VIII.22
The lender's two fundamental legitimate interests are the borrower's
personal ability to make the payments on the loan229 and the adequacy of
the collateral to secure payment in the event of default.23 Thus the bor-
rower's income, credit history and financial stability are proper areas of
inquiry.231 Similarly, the lender's long-term interest in the mortgaged
property requires consideration, not only of its present value, but of its
value over the life of the loan.232
Where lending practices generate discriminatory effects, business ne-
cessity analysis suggests that, at a minimum, mere presumptions about
risk and creditworthiness should not be tolerated. Lenders may in fact
incur greater costs in making the urban loans in which Title VIII
225. See Attacking Redlining, supra note 222, at 1009 ("lending policies are of a profes-
sional nature").
The secondary mortgage market also imposes strictures on the originating lender. See
Redlining Study, supra note 186, at 1-33; Watson, Creative Forms of Finance Discrimina-
tion, in A Sheltered Crisis, supra note 109, at 94, 94.
226. Legality of Redlining, supra note 224, at 482 (comparable to fiduciary duty of
corporation to its stockholders).
This obligation also has a regulatory component. See Attacking Redlining, supra note
222, at 991; cf Watson, supra note 225, at 94 ("S&Ls that deviate from sound lending
practices are courting problems with their regulatory agencies."); Legality of Redlining,
supra note 224, at 468 (foreclosure is an option if the borrower defaults, but regulatory
agencies do not look favorably on foreclosed property as security for savings); Redlining
Solutions, supra note 111, at 123-24 (traditional institutional conservatism rooted in duty
to depositors, but depositors are now protected by regulatory agencies).
227. To ensure professional advancement, individual banking officers try to make only
the safest loans. Attacking Redlining, supra note 222, at 991.
228. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
229. See Duncan, Hood & Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation, and Urban
Decay: Neighborhood Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 Urb. Law. 510, 512
(1975) (one of mortgage lender's dual goals is to secure regular flow of principal and
interest payments); Attacking Redlining, supra note 222, at 991-92 (lender's concerns ex-
pressed in terms of risk of default).
230. See Redlining Study, supra note 186, at 1-10 (security risk arises when the under-
lying value of the property is not enough to pay the outstanding loan balance plus costs of
foreclosure).
231. Watson, supra note 225, at 94 (these factors are part of the lender's normal under-
writing standards to assess the prospective buyer's creditworthiness).
232. See Redlining Study, supra note 186, at 11-42 (underwriting takes into considera-
tion both present appraised value and long-term value of the property); Attacking Redlin-
ing, supra note 222, at 992-93 (adequate protection requires anticipation of probable
value over several decades).
In this respect, many practices noted in the context of appraisal, see supra Part
II.B.2.a., are encountered again. Lenders' property evaluation forms at one time sought
information about the racial stability and composition of neighborhoods as a factor in
evaluating loans. See Legality of Redlining, supra note 224, at 469 & n.37. Bankers con-
sidered racial composition a legitimate factor because it affected property values.
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problems are most likely to arise.233 These costs include administrative
expenses, the unique risks to which urban property is subject, and the
post-foreclosure problems that the urban property presents. 2- Where
such exigencies are asserted as the reason for the denial of a loan, the
lender should be prepared to demonstrate and defend them. Of the two
parties to the transaction, the institutional lender, not the individual bor-
rower, is best equipped to make this showing.235 In the alternative com-
ponent of the analysis, the lender should be required to inquire into
factors, such as federal assistance available to the urban owner,236 that
may not customarily be part of the institution's evaluation of
creditworthiness.
Redlining, the policy of denying loans within geographically defined
areas denominated "bad risks" without considering the merits of the in-
dividual applicant 237 has been a particularly difficult problem for urban
minority property owners.238 As a business evaluation of neighborhood
characteristics, 239 redlining is not facially discriminatory. Its disparate
effect on minorities, however, is now generally acknowledged 2,° and it
has been identified as a factor in urban decay.241
Many of the justifications for redlining are credible.242 Factors present
233. See Attacking Redlining, supra note 222, at 994-96. There is some contrary evi-
dence, however. See supra note 211.
234. See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
235. Lending evaluation machinery is in place; any change of practice would be more
in the nature of calibrating the kind of questions asked and the kind of answer the lender
is willing to accept than in installing new mechanisms. Simply to expunge presumptions
and document conclusions would substantially improve matters; such procedures would
also operate to protect the lender in the event of a lawsuit.
236. For example, special mortgage insurance is available to low-income persons. See
12 U.S.C. § 1715z-2 (1982); 24 C.F.R. § 237.1 (1985).
237. See Legality of Redlining, supra note 224, at 465.
238. See Searing, supra note 221, at 1113-14 (redlining renders areas off limits for lend-
ing, principally in central cities or suburban pockets occupied largely by blacks).
239. See Redlining Study, supra note 186, at 1-10 (reluctance to lend in a designated
area ostensibly based on the lender's perception of economic risk); Legality of Redlining,
supra note 224, at 465 (lenders redline because of age of property and the low income or
racial composition of residents). Racial motivations may influence the decision, but they
are difficult to disentangle from business and economic considerations. See id. at 469.
240. Redlining has been held violative of Title VIII's prohibition of discrimination in
financing, 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1982). See Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F.
Supp. 489, 493 (S.D. Ohio 1976). The Laufman court also intimated that redlining in
financing was within the scope of the omnibus "otherwise make unavailable or deny"
provision of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1982). "The same conduct may
be prohibited by either or both provisions." Laufman, 408 F. Supp. at 493; see also
Harrison v. Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 430 F. Supp. 893, 896 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (defend-
ant's agent discouraged plaintiff from purchasing property in racially transitional area
and imposed unusual financing terms; conduct held violative of 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605,
and 3617).
241. See Legality of Redlining, supra note 224, at 465-66. New owners cannot buy,
present owners cannot sell or refinance. Id. This consequence is clear, regardless of
whether redlining itself is cause or effect. See Attacking Redlining, supra note 222, at
1005-06.
242. See Attacking Redlining, supra note 222, at 996.
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in the urban environment may objectively put repayment and collateral
sufficiency at risk. 43 But under business necessity analysis, conclusory
presumptions cannot justify practices that disproportionately affect pro-
tected groups. 244 Considering that evidence of actual difficulties in urban
areas is inconclusive,2 45 a lender should be prepared to back up a conclu-
sion of area-wide risk with hard data; its unsubstantiated, conclusory
opinion should never suffice. Moreover, the lender should have to show
how failure to redline would jeopardize its assets,2 46 not merely posit as-
sumptions to the effect that it would. Indeed, the availability-of-alterna-
tives component of the analysis would seem to indicate that redlining has
tenuous validity: it is unlikely that the practice furthers any legitimate
business purposes that could not be achieved by nondiscriminatory or
less discriminatory means. 24
v
d. Redlining in the Insurance Industry
Redlining by property insurers shares characteristics and motivations
with redlining by lenders. 45 The decision to insure or not to insure must
243. Id. at 994-95. High unemployment, low per capita income, and age of structures
may coincide to cause risk of default and collateral insufficiency. Id.
Administrative costs are higher on urban loans: fixed costs represent a higher percent-
age of the small urban loan. Because of the likelihood of vandalism, the lender must also
incur costs of inspection unnecessary for property located elsewhere. See Legality of Red-
lining, supra note 224, at 467.
The lender is likely to incur increased costs in forcing delinquents to pay. Such costs
may multiply for the lender with a large portfolio of urban loans and it may be unable to
absorb the losses. Foreclosure, because of the expense and time involved, is also unattrac-
tive; the lender becomes the owner of possibly undesirable urban property, with problems
and costs of management. Older urban residential property often has little to recommend
it as a prudent investment. See id. at 467-68.
244. See Legality of Redlining, supra note 224, at 482 (institution's unsubstantiated
belief that no profitable loans could be made in redlined area would not establish business
necessity) (quoting 2 U.S. League of Say. Ass'ns Fed. Guide % U 13-49.2, at 8173-76
(1974)); see also Attacking Redlining, supra note 222, at 1007 ("if a perfectly sound neigh-
borhood is disinvested for arbitrary reasons, it is entirely reasonable to place the burden
on institutional lenders by requiring them to alter their lending practices").
245. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. As already noted, strong arguments
can be made that urban mortgage lending is risky. See supra note 243 and accompanying
text.
246. See Legality of Redlining, supra note 224, at 482 (arguing that lender should be
required to show actual, substantiated loss experience as opposed to minimal
unprofitability).
247. Id. at 481 (quoting 2 U.S. League of Say. Ass'ns Fed. Guide U 13-49.2 at 8173-
76 (1974)).
248. These factors have already been discussed in the context of mortgage redlining.
See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
One author interprets insurance redlining expansively, including not only outright re-
fusals to provide services on the basis of the location of the property, but all institutional
practices that have the effect of limiting the availability or affordability of insurance (and
lending) services in certain neighborhoods. See Badain, supra note 187, at 4. These prac-
tices include refusing insurance for structures over 40 years old and limiting coverage to
market value rather than higher replacement cost to decrease incentive to commit arson
for profit. Id. at 13-14.
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be based on sound underwriting principles.24 9 This supposedly objective
analysis should support a refusal to insure if it exposes a connection to
actual or anticipated loss experience. 250 Despite the objective factors
with which insurers seek to quantify their judgments, decisions tend to be
more impressionistic than empirical. 25
A refusal to insure will also have a significant secondary effect for the
prospective home buyer since the lender's decision is typically condi-
tioned on insuring the property. Insurance redlining therefore exacer-
bates and accelerates disinvestment. For the minority homebuyer in the
urban environment, the resultant depressing effect on housing opportu-
nity is devastating.
25 2
Although Title VIII does not by its terms apply to the insurance in-
dustry,25 3 one district court has held that the practice of insurance red-
lining falls within the general "otherwise make unavailable or deny"
provision of the Act.2 1 In Dunn v. Midwestern Indemnity Mid-Ameri-
can Fire & Casualty Co.,255 the court noted the "nexus among insurance,
financing, and the availability of suitable housing"2" 6 and held that insur-
ance redlining effectively restricted the availability of housinge and was
therefore violative of Title VIII.25 8
The Dunn court's conclusion seems a sound and logical consequence
of the acceptance of liability based on disparate impact.2 59 But its view
249. See Badain, supra note 187, at 4 n.16 (quoting Advisory Comm. to the Nat'l
Ass'n Of Ins. Comm'rs Task Force on Redlining Ninety Day Report 2-3 (1978)). Profit-
ability in the insurance industry depends on adverse selection-selling to the lowest-risk
customers. Id. at 5.
250. See Advisory Comm. to the Nat'l Ass'n Of Ins. Comm'rs Task Force on Redlin-
ing Ninety Day Report 2-3 (1978), quoted in Badain, supra note 187, at 4 n.16.
Practices that have the effect of limiting access to services therefore should not be
considered unlawful if there is a "direct causal relationship to an increased probability of
loss." Badain, supra note 187, at 4.
251. Badain, supra note 187, at 37.
Insurance officials cannot quantify many of the factors on which they rely, yet express
considerable faith in them. Iad at 14 n.72 (quoting Rights and Remedies of Insurance
Policyholders: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights and
Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83 (1978) (testi-
mony of William S. Gibson, Vice President and Assoc. General Counsel, Continental Ins.
Cos.)).
252. Badain, supra note 187, at 35; see also id. at 3 & n.8, 5 (insurance availability and
affordability in urban areas are crises of monstrous proportion, with profound effect in
cycle of disinvestment in inner cities) (quoting Insurance Crisis in Urban America 44
(1978)).
253. Title VIII covers insurers, but only when they act in the capacity of lenders and
provide financing. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1982).
254. Id § 3604(a). See supra note 2.
255. 472 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
256. See id. at 1109.
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See Dale, Discrimination in Housing: A Legal Perspective, in Congressional Re-
search Service, House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., Housing-A Reader, at 139, 148-49 (Comm. Print 1983) (characterizing Dunn
1986]
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was rejected by the Fourth Circuit in Mackey v. Nationwide Insurance
Cos. ,260 which held the practice of insurance redlining not within the cov-
erage of Title VIII.26 The Mackey court relied heavily on legislative
intent gleaned from the failure of amendments that would have brought
the insurance industry expressly within the purview of the Act.262 From
that failure the Mackey court concluded that Congress intended to ex-
clude the insurance industry, traditionally a matter of state regulation,263
from the strictures of Title VIII. "If [Title VIII] was designed to reach
every discriminatory act that might conceivably affect the availability of
housing," the court observed, "[its] specific prohibition of discrimination
in the provision of financing would have been superfluous." 26
This argument fails to account for other considerations suggested by
settled Title VIII doctrine. Disparate impact liability was not expressly
contemplated by the legislators who enacted Title VII or Title VIII,265
yet is recognized under each statute.266 Similarly, the Fair Housing Act
has been applied to public entities although it does not by its terms so
apply.267 Moreover, as the Supreme Court has observed, the sweeping
language of Title VIII merits generous interpretation. 268 This breadth
reflects urgent legislative concern with the national priority of integrated
holding as "a small transition" from similar holding on mortgage redlining); Jennings,
Redlining-Now Insurers Are Guilty of It, Too, 8 Real Estate L.J. 323, 329 (1980) ("the
step to involvement of insurers is not a dramatic one").
260. 724 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1984).
261. See id. at 423.
262. See id. at 424.
263. See id. at 423.
264. Id.
265. Neither statute defines discrimination in terms of effect-nor, however, does
either define it in terms of purpose. Schwemm, supra note 2, at 202 & n.23. Statutory
language is ultimately inconclusive on the issue of disparate impact liability. Id. at 207
(Title VIII). The concept of business necessity antedates the passage of Title VII but was
only judicially incorporated. Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 379.
266. Since Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), the Supreme Court
has reiterated its approval of disparate effect liability in Title VII. See Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 327-28 (1977);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). There is similar agreement
among the circuits in Title VIII. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. See also
Schwemm, supra note 2, at 215 (disparate impact analysis formulated in Griggs less as
matter of statutory construction than because it "simply makes sense"). Congress itself
has expressed approval of disparate impact liability. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 447 n.8 (1982); Judicial Dualism, supra note 3, at 381; see also 117 Cong. Rec.
31,961 (1971) (statement of Rep. Perkins).
267. See infra Part II.C.
268. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (white resi-
dents had standing to sue because discriminatory landlord practices deprived them of
benefits of integrated housing; generous construction of statute proper).
"This mandate by a unanimous Supreme Court to construe Title VIII broadly has
become the foundation for all subsequent judicial interpretations of the Fair Housing
Act." R. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law 39 (1983). The language of the stat-
ute is "as broad as Congress could have made it." United States v. Youritan Constr. Co.,
370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd in relevant part, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir.
1975).
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housing.2 69 Against this background, the intimate connection between in-
surance practices and housing availability would seem to support a prima
facie case based on its disparate effect. At the very least, the argument
for subjecting insurance redlining to effect-based liability has a logical
force that the Mackey court's discussion does not fully dispel.
If a court can be persuaded to accept the Dunn view, it is difficult to
imagine how a convincing showing of such impact could be reconciled
with business necessity scrutiny. As in both appraisal and lending, tradi-
tional reliance on supposedly objective factors in the insurance business
may not be highly rational.270 Indeed, many such factors are not objec-
tively quantified and others are statistically dubious.27" ' Insurance under-
writers may act out of an excess of caution stemming from concern with
professional advancement in an industry that prizes conservatism.272 At
the very least, the defendant insurer should be held to a significant bur-
den of demonstrating some relationship between its underwriting criteria
and protection of the interests it urges as matters of business necessity.
C. The Public Defendant
The treatment of public entity defendants highlights a critical analyti-
cal distinction between the employment and housing contexts. Title VII
is applied to both public and private employers. 273 For public and pri-
vate employers, the business necessity standard is appropriate to assess
the job-relatedness of testing programs, for example, or the relevance of
physical requirements to the employment. The interests of public entities
as employers are analytically no different from those of private
employers.274
In Title VIII, however, the consensus is that a different approach is
appropriate for public defendants.27 This reflects the role of public enti-
269. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972).
270. For discussion of these factors in the context of appraisal and lending, see supra
notes 209-14, 224 and accompanying text.
271. See Badain, supra note 187, at 17-18 (age of structure an accurate loss predictor
only in very limited circumstances; "moral hazard" problem, i.e., the idea that insurance
over market value encourages arson, not as large as assumed-at least with respect to
owner-occupied buildings-and amenable to solution by methods other than refusal to
insure at all).
272. Ido at 13 & n.65. Preconceptions are reinforced by the underwriter's or agent's
contact with his or her colleagues within the industry. Id. at 37.
273. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977) ("for both private and pub-
lic employers, '[t]he touchstone is business necessity' ") (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
274. Courts that have applied the business necessity analysis to public defendants have
made no distinction based on the fact that the defendant is not a private "business" en-
tity. See, eg., Newman v. Crews, 651 F.2d 222, 224 (4th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Colo-
rado Springs School Dist. No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 839-40 (10th Cir. 1981); deLaurier v.
San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1978).
275. See Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984) ("a




ties in performing administrative and regulatory functions that have no
counterpart in employment.276 When public entities engage in activities
analogous to those of private landlords, such as construction or adminis-
tration of public housing projects, a different standard is still proper be-
cause of the remedial nature of the activities.277
It is generally agreed that public defendants are subject to disparate-
effect liability, 278 but there is no consensus on an appropriate standard
for such defendants' rebuttal of the prima facie case. Courts that have
considered the issue agree that a different, and in some respects more
exacting, standard is indicated. 279 The concept of business necessity is
not available as such to the public entity:280 it cannot raise many issues
of legitimate concern to the private defendant. But neither can the public
defendant be held strictly liable. Some room for justification is needed.
1. Justifying the Public Entity's Actions
Several courts have confronted the question of the proper rebuttal bur-
den for the public defendant. The tests they have used vary widely in
language, but each essentially balances the defendant's interests against
the discriminatory impact of the action.
The most straightforward of these tests is that formulated by the Third
Circuit in Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo.28 "[A] justification must
serve, in theory and practice, a legitimate, bona fide interest of the Title
VIII defendant, and the defendant must show that no alternative course
of action could be adopted that would enable that interest to be served
with less discriminatory impact. ' 282 The court acknowledged the fact-
specific nature of the inquiry,283 distinguishing the Title VII employment
context and its more quantifiable "job-related qualities." '284
A second view manifests a desire to place a heavy burden on the public
276. See Arthur v. City of Toledo, No. 84-3898, slip op. at 4-5 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 1986)
(referenda on sewer extension ordinances; defeat alleged to have had discriminatory effect
of impeding low-income housing construction); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1285 (7th Cir. 1977) (zoning decision; similar ef-
fect), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
277. See infra notes 299-302 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., Arthur v. City of Toledo, No. 84-3898, slip op. at 18 (6th Cir. Jan. 24,
1986); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denicd,
435 U.S. 908 (1978); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City
of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
Older cases argue by analogy to Title VII, but Arthur v. City of Toledo, No. 84-3898, slip
op. at 18-19 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 1986) draws exclusively on the now-substantial body of
Title VIII doctrine.
279. See infra notes 281-95 and accompanying text.
280. See Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984).
281. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
282. Id. at 149.
283. See id.
284. See id. at 148.
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defendant when it engages in governmental functions. -85  In United
States v. City of Black Jack,28 6 the Eighth Circuit adopted the strict scru-
tiny of equal protection doctrine for a public defendant under Title
VIII. 87 The Rizzo court had rejected the standard as too stringent for
actions unmotivated by discriminatory animus.18s The Black Jack stan-
dard seems to acknowledge this concern implicitly, for its "necessary to a
compelling interest" language is tempered by three further factors de-
rived from mainstream Title VII business necessity analysis, including
the availability of less discriminatory alternatives."8 9 In reality, then, the
Eighth Circuit approach resembles Title VII thinking: its invocation of
strict scrutiny seems functionally more an expression of policy than a
true "standard."
The third formulation is the most narrowly tailored to the particular
facts of the case before the court. In Metropolitan Housing Development
285. The governmental-function distinction suggests a heavier burden of justification,
as this view implies. Should a similar weight carry over into the non-governmental activi-
ties of the public entity? Such activities play a critical role in remedial programs ad-
dressed to segregation in housing and to the needs of low-income persons. For reasons of
public policy, a heavier burden seems appropriate for governmental programs in areas
analogous to private housing activity. See infra notes 298-305 and accompanying text.
286. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
287. See id. at 1185 & n.4. The court applied the standard without discussion, stating
simply that, "once the United States established a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion, it became proper to apply the compelling governmental interest requirement of the
equal protection cases." Id at 1185 n.4.
The Supreme Court has since held that equal protection standards do not, in some
respects, apply in Title VII and Title VIII. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
the Court held that the disparate impact standard of Title VII was insufficient to make
out an equal protection violation; the Court emphasized that the statutory and constitu-
tional levels required different rules. Id at 238-39. An equal protection violation, unlike
Title VII, requires a showing of discriminatory purpose. Id. at 239.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977), the Court reiterated this distinction in the context of housing. Id. at 264-65. The
Court held that effect alone did not make out an equal protection violation, but remanded
for consideration of the Title VIII claim. Id at 270-71.
The Court has not spoken on the related question of whether the strict scrutiny of
equal protection may be invoked under the statutes. Since the Court's Washington and
Arlington Heights opinions, no circuit has invoked the compelling interest standard in a
Title VIII case. The Black Jack court indeed adjusted the standard to bring it into line
with conventional Title VIII thinking. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
288. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). The district court had followed Black Jack in holding the
defendant to the compelling interest standard, but the Third Circuit held that standard
applicable only to cases involving purposeful discrimination. See id.
289. In determining whether any of these [asserted interests] rise to the level of a
compelling governmental interest, we must examine: first, whether the ordi-
nance in fact furthers the governmental interest asserted; second, whether the
public interest served by the ordinance is constitutionally permissible and is
substantial enough to outweigh the private detriment caused by it; and third,
whether less drastic means are available whereby the stated governmental inter-
est may be attained.
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186-87 (8th Cir. 1974) (footnotes
omitted), cert denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). Compare this with the classic Title VII
formulation, supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights29° the Seventh Circuit held that the
liability of a public defendant depended on
[flour critical factors .... (1) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of
discriminatory effect; (2) is there some evidence of discriminatory in-
tent... ; (3) what is the defendant's interest in taking the action com-
plained of; and (4) does the plaintiff seek to compel the defendant to
affirmatively provide housing for members of minority groups or
merely to restrain the defendant from interfering with individual prop-
erty owners who wish to provide such housing.291
In considering the governmental entity's interests, the Seventh Circuit
noted that greater deference would be appropriate when the action at-
tacked falls "within the ambit of legitimately derived authority,' '292 espe-
cially in the area of zoning, where municipalities are traditionally
afforded wide discretion.293 But the court also implied that the strength
of those interests is, at least in part, a function of the relative strength of
the plaintiff's interests-including "furthering the congressionally sanc-
tioned goal of integrated housing." '294 In this sense, the test balances
competing interests.
The analogy to business necessity analysis is helpful in evaluating the
justification offered by public defendants. The concept of business neces-
sity suggests that any defendant should be required to explain its actions,
and to bear liability if the explanation is inadequate. For a governmental
entity, whose actions have tremendous potential for harm,295 a high
threshold of justification seems appropriate. The balancing process at the
core of the courts' analyses allows consideration of all relevant factors.
290. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) (Arlington Heights I1), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025
(1978).
291. Id. at 1290.
The second of these factors was discounted by the court, which called it "the least
important of the four." Id. at 1292. Indeed, it is conceptually puzzling because, by defi-
nition, a disparate effect case may be made out without showing intent, and intentional
discrimination is always violative of Title VIII. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
The Sixth Circuit, in recognizing disparate effect liability for a public entity defendant,
adopted the Arlington Heights 11 "critical factors," but omitted the second. See Arthur v.
City of Toledo, No. 84-3898, slip op. at 19 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 1986).
The tailoring of this analysis to the facts of Arlington Heights 11 limits its applicability
in other situations. The Fourth Circuit has observed that it has no application to private
defendants. Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 988 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984) (test
from Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982), identical to that in
Arlington Heights II). The list of factors may also lend the test a qualify of concreteness
it does not really have. See Schwemm, supra note 2, at 257 (criticizing the test's lack of
guidance on relative weight of the four factors).
292. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1293.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. For example, the government entity can impede construction of new moderate-
income housing by its zoning, as in Arlington Heights II, or can fail to provide assistance
services without which a project cannot proceed, as in Rizzo. It may take such actions
without awareness of their discriminatory effect, or, as in United States v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1373 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), do so deliberately.
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Although each commits the resolution to the discretion of the trial court,
all echo the rationale of the business necessity defense in affording the
public entity the opportunity to overcome the prima facie case.
The availability-of-alternatives component of the analysis provides in-
centive to explore approaches that might reduce racially discriminatory
impact. If none is in fact available, the public entity will have tried and
will be able to document the attempt. In both respects, this part of the
analysis has considerable potential for fostering the goals of Title VIII.
2. Public Entities as Governmental and as Quasi-Private
Housing Actors
The temptation to hold the governmental entity to the compelling in-
terest standard is strongest when the challenged action is one tradition-
ally performed by government. Zoning and issuing of building permits
are two examples; 96 these functions clearly have substantial impact on
the housing activities of third persons and may have discriminatory ef-
fects.297 In such a situation, the standards discussed above come into
play to assess the justification put forward by the governmental
defendant.
In addition to regulatory activities that affect private activity, the gov-
ernment may itself be an actor in the housing arena.298 In federally-sup-
ported programs alone, the local housing authority may own and operate
public housing projects299 as well as administer certification for existing-
housing rent subsidies.3 0o The same statutes that provide for the assist-
296. Land use regulation and construction permit policy are particularly amenable to
analysis under the Arlington Heights II standard. See supra note 291 and accompanying
text. The Rizzo standard may be an even more useful tool because of its high degree of
adaptability to varying fact situations. See supra note 282.
297. In Rizzo, the defendant failed to provide police protection and a contractor who
was building a low-income housing project was unable to proceed in the face of commu-
nity protest. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 135. The plaintiff in Arlington Heights I1 had requested a
zoning variance; the defendant's denial "effectively precluded the construction." Arling-
ton Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1286. These cases exemplify the power of governmental enti-
ties over the activities of private parties.
298. Interesting facts were presented in Parks v. Coleman, No. N-81-24, slip op. (D.
Conn. July 19, 1985). The defendant public housing authority (PHA) administered two
assistance programs. One was PHA-run low-income housing funded by the federal gov-
ernment. Id. at 2. The other was an in-place rent subsidy program ("Section 8") that
enabled low-income persons to live in private housing. Id. at 3. The PHA had a 25%
rule for the subsidy program: priority was accorded applicants who spent more than
25% of monthly income on housing. Id. at 4.
Because the residents of public housing were paying less than 25% of their income for
housing-their rents were, of course, artificially low-they were effectively precluded
from receiving Section 8 assistance. Id. at 7-8. So, because the residents of public hous-
ing were overwhelmingly black, id. at 2, the 25% rule had a racially disparate effect. Id.
at 14.
These facts illustrate both the typical activities of a local public-entity housing actor,
and the morass of conflicting duties it can encounter even when it acts in good faith.
299. See Parks v. Coleman, No. N-81-24, slip op. at 2, 5 (D. Conn. July 19, 1985).
300. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1982).
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ance also impose affirmative obligations on the local housing authority to
administer the programs in a nondiscriminatory fashion.3 ' In this
scheme, the local entity plays a critical role in programs that serve twin
goals of assisting the needy and ameliorating segregated housing
patterns.3 °2
The public entity as landlord makes tenant selection decisions analo-
gous to those made by private landlords. 3  However, many factors that
are proper considerations for the private businessperson cannot rightly
be taken into account by the public entity. For instance, the private
landlord's relative freedom to base decisions on subjective criteria 30 is
more sharply circumscribed where the landlord is a public housing au-
thority. Similarly, income criteria are less critical.305
CONCLUSION
Despite the usefulness of Title VII precedent in Title VIII housing liti-
gation, the limits of the analogy between the two laws are critical. The
different considerations operative in the housing context suggest that a
strict attitude toward the defendant's burden of justification in disparate
impact cases is appropriate in Title VIII. This distinction further sug-
gests that the more stringent attitude should be retained in Title VIII
regardless of any tendency in Title VII toward greater deference to em-
ployer discretion. The business necessity defense illustrates and focuses
these limits. While it can be useful in housing cases, it must be tailored
and adjusted to correspond to the peculiar problems of the housing con-
text. So adjusted, the defense--or, more properly, the analytical process
it represents--can be useful in encouraging a close relation between legit-
imate business needs and criteria responsive to those needs, while serving
the purposes of Title VIII in minimizing unintended discriminatory
effects.
Christopher P. McCormack
301. The local housing authority is required to certify to HUD that the authority in-
tends to comply with Title VIII, inter alia. 24 C.F.R. § 882.204(b)(1)(iii) (1985). A vio-
lation of Title VIII in the administration of a Section 8 program is thus privately
actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982).
302. Cf. Parks v. Coleman, No. N-81-24, slip op. at 18 (D. Conn. July 19, 1985) (avail-
able alternatives would allow defendant to serve the greatest number of eligible
households).
303. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
304. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text. It is difficult to imagine what sort
of subjective criteria might be used by a public entity. Rather, it would seem best for it to
develop comprehensive eligibility standards that minimize the influence of subjective
judgment.
305. Income criteria cannot have the same meaning for the public entity as for the
private actor because the latter is carrying on business for profit. Similarly, where the
private landlord is interested in tenants who make enough to pay the rent, the public
entity is concerned with restricting eligibility to those who cannot make enough.
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